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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a new model of political competition where candidates belong to factions. Before
elections, factions compete to direct local public goods to their local constituencies. The model of
factional competition delivers a rich set of implications relating the internal organization of the party
to the allocation of resources. Several key theoretical predictions of the model find a counterpart in
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This paper presents a new model of political competition where candidates belong to intra-
party factions. Before elections, hierarchical networks of party o¢ cials (factions) compete
to direct local public goods to their constituencies and thereby win votes and advance their
careers within the party. The model delivers a rich set of implications linking the allocation
of public resources to the internal organization of the party. In doing so, the model provides
a uni￿ed explanation of two prominent features of public resource allocations: the tendency
of public spending to favor incumbent party strongholds and the persistence of (possibly
ine¢ cient) policies. We illustrate the model with analysis of data on the provision of water
services in Mexico and ￿nd empirical support for many of the model￿ s key predictions.
A vast formal literature has investigated the connection between elections and the size and
allocation of public spending.1 Virtually all of this literature treats competing political
agents as singletons, be they candidates or parties, vested with the power to deliver or
promise resources. This view is often oversimpli￿ed. In reality, the power to deliver public
resources to a constituency is often dispersed among (networks of) party and government
o¢ cials. To illustrate, consider the well-documented case of Lyndon Johnson and his suc-
cessful e⁄orts as a ￿rst-term U.S. Congressman to bring a massive federal dam project to his
district in Texas.2 Johnson needed to secure land rights, mobilize local support, obtain Con-
gressional and regulatory approvals, and ensure both the appropriation of funds and their
timely disbursement. Each of these processes was complex and fraught with political and
legal obstacles. To achieve all this, Johnson tapped a network of contacts in the Democratic
party for help with each step. This network, or faction, ranged from the party rank and ￿le
in Texas, to Congressional leaders, to White House o¢ cials, each with an incentive to assist
Johnson and his constituents. By this account, and others like it (see Section 2, below), the
political allocation of resources results from a team e⁄ort: it depends on the size and power
of the party faction available to each local representative.
What are party factions? How do they form and persist? What purposes (if any) do factions
serve for political parties? How do factions a⁄ect the allocation of public resources, across
constituencies and through time? To answer these questions, we construct a simple model
of network formation and exchange among party o¢ cials ￿a model informed by a large
descriptive literature on intra-party factions.
In the model, each of many districts holds an election in which a party o¢ ce-holder competes
1This literature includes models with commitment by candidates￿ in one policy dimension (median voter,
see Black 1948) or in many dimensions (distributive politics, see Lindbeck and Weibull 1987)￿ and models
without commitment (citizen candidates, see Osborne and Slivinski 1996, Besley and Coate 1997). There
are also agency models (Barro 1973, Persson, Roland and Tabellini 1997) and signaling models (the political
cycle, Rogo⁄ 1990), just to name a few.
2A vivid account is provided in Caro (1983, pp. 370-385 and 459-468).
1against a challenger from an opposition party. To win, it helps the o¢ ce-holder to deliver
local public goods before the election; and this delivery requires the assistance of fellow party
o¢ cers. If it is in their interest, these fellow o¢ cers can work to help bring public resources
to a district. The objective of party o¢ cers is to advance their careers (maintain their elected
o¢ ces, or improve their positions within the party); and for this, we assume they need the
support of other party members. Thus the opportunity for a quid-pro-quo emerges: party
o¢ cers need support for promotion and in return for such support they can o⁄er assistance in
securing public resources. We call this exchange the patron-client relationship. In our model,
we study the formation and persistence of networks of patron-client relationships. Echoing a
literature in political science, we call durable networks of patron-client relationships factions
of interest. While factions of interest have been the subject of a large descriptive literature,
to our knowledge, there is no formal model either of the formation of party factions or of their
e⁄ect on public spending. Understanding the dynamics of intra-party networks is important
because of their impact on resource allocation.
Regarding faction formation, our analysis suggests that two organizational features ￿ promo-
tion that depends on other o¢ cers￿support, and dispersed power to in￿ uence the allocation
of resources ￿ generate strong incentives for the formation of patron-client relationships.
These organizational features, and their associated quid pro quo, appear to be common
among political parties. Consistent with this view, factions of interest are found in a variety
of political systems. We discuss a few prominent examples in Section 2.
Regarding the e⁄ect of party factions on the allocation of resources, our analysis also has
novel implications. Among these is an explanation for the tendency of public spending to
favor incumbent party strongholds. In the standard, static models of distributive politics
(Lindbeck and Weibull 1987, for example), a given public budget is allocated across localities
to maximize the sum of the probabilities of winning. In these models, ￿swing￿districts are
the focus of pork spending as their votes are the most responsive to public largesse; localities
(or groups) that are loyal to the party, or ￿party strongholds,￿ are predicted to receive
relatively little. Tests of the standard models have produced mixed results. A number of
studies, of many di⁄erent countries, either ￿nd little evidence that spending is directed to
swing constituencies or that ruling party strongholds bene￿t disproportionately from public
expenditures.3 The factional model accounts for this ￿stronghold premium.￿In the model,
the premium arises because party strongholds tend to elect the party￿ s candidate, and so
over time their factions become over-represented within the party￿ s hierarchy.4
3This literature is discussed in Section 1.1. Motivated in part by evidence of stronghold spending, Cox
and McCubbins (1986) o⁄er a prominent alternative to the ￿swing-voter￿models, in which incumbent strong
holds or ￿core-voters￿are favored by pork spending because they are more responsive than opposition voters
and not as risky as swing voters.
4We do not contend that factions are the only source of the ￿stronghold premium.￿There may be other
features of party organization that confer special advantage to strongholds.
2At the same time, the model o⁄ers a novel explanation for the persistence of policies. Lead-
ing models of policy persistence have emphasized forces that are outside the parties￿ either
vested interests facing switching costs (Coate and Morris 1999), or voters who are uncer-
tain of the gains from reform (Fernandez and Rodrik 1991). The factional model identi￿es
an additional source of persistence￿ the persistence of factions within the party hierarchy.
Powerful factions take time to build, but once built, they are resilient￿ they become durable
reservoirs of power for special interests (geographic or otherwise). The model predicts per-
sistence even if the individuals that compose factions or hold o¢ ces turn over. Such is the
case in Mexico, for example, where by law o¢ ce-holders cannot be re-elected and yet those
districts blessed with powerful factions enjoy durable largesse.5 Factional politics also links
public spending to political careers, so patterns of party promotions should have explanatory
power for the allocation of funds. These and other predictions, that trace out the impor-
tance of faction power for the allocation of public expenditure, are not captured by existing
political economy models.
We illustrate the model￿ s predictions with a case study of the provision of water services in
Mexico, where party factions (called camarillas) have long played a prominent role. Using
newly coded panel data on water infrastructure spending in more than 450 Mexican munic-
ipalities, we ￿rst document a substantial spike in public expenditure in the year of a state
governor￿ s election, a ￿political budget cycle.￿We then examine the cross-sectional distri-
bution of this cycle for evidence of persistence in the allocation of expenditure, the party
stronghold premium, and links between public spending and political careers. Our ￿ndings
support several of the important predictions of the factional model.
1.1 Related literature
There is a large descriptive literature in political science on party factions. Much of that
literature addresses themes that are central to our model￿ the forces that generate factions,
the e⁄ect of factions on the allocation of public spending. General theories of party factions
are discussed in Belloni and Beller (1976) and Kato and Mershon (2006). See our section 2
below for more from the political science literature.
Our paper also relates to a literature in economics on collusion in hierarchies. See e.g.
Tirole (1986), or Carrillo (2000). Strictly speaking, our￿ s is not a model of corruption or
even collusion; indeed, the patron-client relationship has bene￿ts for the party because it
motivates patrons to exert e⁄ort on behalf of clients. Nevertheless, our paper can be seen
as a ￿rst e⁄ort to apply some themes from that literature to political parties. Dal B￿ et al.
5Lyndon Johnson￿ s faction, discussed above, was also persistent despite turnover. Johnson largely in-
heirited it from James P. Buchanan, the 12-term Congressman whose death in 1937 left open the seat that
Johnson then won.
3(2007) on familial legacies in the U.S. Congress is a related paper with an empirical focus.
The factional model opens the black box of internal party organization. There is a small
literature on platform competition in a non-unitary party, and on the e⁄ect of party charters
on platforms. See Caillaud and Tirole (2002), Testa (2003), Castanheira et al. (2005).
Finally, our paper also relates to two strands of a literature concerned with the distribution
of public expenditure. The ￿rst strand, discussed in the introduction, seeks to understand
the persistence of ine¢ cient policies.6 The second strand is a literature that has tested the
standard model of distributive politics using data on public expenditures. Larcinese, Rizzo
and Testa (2006) and Larcinese, Snyder and Testa (2006) are recent examples and provide
thorough reviews. The results in this literature are mixed and often show that spending
favors party strongholds. In the U.S. context, for example, Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006)
￿nd that counties with the highest vote shares for the governing party of a state receive the
most state transfers. Stronghold spending has been found in a number of non-U.S. contexts
as well. Examples include Joanis (2007) on Canadian provincial governments, Barkan and
Chege (1989) on Kenya, Estevez, et al. (2002) on Mexico, and Dasgupta et al. (2004) on
India. These ￿ndings echo some of the results of our analysis of Mexican water spending.
1.2 Plan of the paper
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe several examples of factions from a
variety political systems and identify key features that they share. In Section 3 we set up the
model. Section 4 shows that our model nests the familiar model of distributive politics as a
special case, the case where the power to deliver public expenditure is not distributed among
the party hierarchy. In Section 5 we study the equilibrium networks formed from patron-
client links. We provide conditions under which persistent networks will form; that is, when
networks will consist of party o¢ cers who support each other in every period. We call
these persistent networks factions. In every period, faction members are tempted to defect
to other, more powerful factions. An equilibrium where members resist this temptation is
called a ￿factional equilibrium￿and is characterized by stable factions. In Section 6 we study
the resource allocation in a factional equilibrium. In Section 7 we further discuss and extend
the model. Section 8 applies the model to evidence from Mexico. Section 9 concludes.
2 Facts About Factions
In this section we brie￿ y discuss factions as they arise in several political systems. The
goal is to familiarize the reader with this phenomenon, and to show that factions share
6In addition the papers cited above, see Hassler et al (2003), and Michell and Moro (2006).
4common traits. We will cover factions in Italy￿ s Christian Democratic Party (DC), Japan￿ s
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Mexico￿ s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), China￿ s
Communist Party (CCP), and politics in Chicago￿ s ￿Daley machine.￿In each of these cases,
we will highlight certain key features. First, the hierarchical nature of relationships inside
a faction; second, the nature of the exchange between patrons and clients; and third, the
e⁄ects of factions on public expenditures.
2.1 What are Factions?
We begin with a broad de￿nition taken from Zuckerman￿ s (1975) study of Italian factions.
I de￿ne a political party faction as a structured group within a political party
which seeks, at a minimum, to control authoritative decision-making positions
of the party. It is a ￿structured group￿in that there are established patterns of
behavior and interaction for the faction members over time. Thus, party factions
are to be distinguished from groups that coalesce around a speci￿c or temporarily
limited issue and then dissolve [...] (Zuckerman, 1975, p. 20).
This de￿nition, which highlights the durability of factions, refers to ￿factions of interest￿
and indicates that these groups should be distinguished from ￿factions of principle￿￿dis-
tinguished, that is, from (intra-party) lobbies organized around particular policy agendas.7
Factions of interest, like the Italian correnti studied by Zuckerman (see more below), are
less idealistic aggregations that pursue their own power, more than general-interest policies.
Bettcher (2005 pp. 343-4) o⁄ers a more precise de￿nition of factions of interest, though he
calls them clienteles.
Clienteles have a pyramidal structure built up from patron￿ client relationships
In a political party, clienteles organize vertical relations among elected politicians
and party o¢ cers, and these relations may extend outward and downward into
di⁄erent levels of government and party organization. The relationships ￿and
thus the overall structure ￿are maintained through exchanges among individu-
als at di⁄erent levels. Lower members (clients) deliver votes to their superiors
(patrons), and in exchange receive selective incentives such as money, jobs, and
services. In other words, members join and remain in the clientele for particular-
istic, self-interested reasons. Continued membership in the clientele also depends
on an ongoing relationship with a particular patron. Consequently, clienteles are
not ￿rmly organized and become vulnerable to collapse if key patrons are lost.
7The terms ￿factions of interest￿and ￿factions of principle￿are borrowed from Bettcher (2005). Factions
of principle appear prominently in U.K. and U.S. parties, for example.
5Our paper is concerned with factions of interest.
2.2 Factions in Italy￿ s DC
The DC Party dominated Italian government from the post-war period until the mid 1990s
and its factions, correnti, were quite formal organizations. Bettcher (2005, p. 351) reports:
Each faction acquired a common identity and common resources. The factions
possessed well-developed organizational features, including: ￿ formalized faction
names, more or less distinct memberships, leadership cadres and chains of com-
mand, faction headquarters, communications networks including press organs,
and faction ￿nances￿(Belloni, 1978: 93). As of 1986, the factions all had of-
￿ces clustered in historic Rome (Panorama, 15 June 1986: 49￿ 50). Meetings
and conventions were held regularly at various levels at least through the 1980s
(L￿ Espresso, 19 February 1989: 8).
Faction members are described by Zuckerman (1975, p. 40) as following three rules:
1) Seek to control cabinet positions. Strive to occupy more and ￿better￿positions
than previously held and to defend those already controlled.
2) Seek to further the career of the leader. Support him in his e⁄ort to achieve
￿better￿positions.
3) Seek to obtain goods of value to those who are not faction members only when
the persistence of the faction or the strength of the Christian Democrat Party is
at stake.
DC factions were typical in that they were not organized around ideology or broad-based
policy goals. One longtime factional leader and cabinet minister contended:
￿The number of factions has now grown to nine. This is due to personal power
games within the party. When a new faction forms, such as the Tavianei, or
the Morotei, it must justify itself in ideological terms, but this is arti￿cial. The
factions are power groups.￿(Quoted in Zuckerman, 1975, p. 26.)
While not primarily motivated by policy, DC factions had a major impact on the distribution
of public resources. Bettcher (2005, pp. 351-2) reports that
6Christian Democratic factions competed vigorously on behalf of their members
for seats in the cabinet and the party￿ s National Council. [...] The factions also
procured and distributed a much broader range of patronage, including public
jobs at all levels. They colonized the state thoroughly and diverted its resources
for their purposes [...]. The Italian regime was infamous for partitocrazia, a sys-
tem in which political parties held preponderance over all aspects of government
and society. The DC received the lion￿ s share of ministries, especially the most
coveted ones (for example, Agriculture, Post and Telecommunications, and State
Holdings) (Leonardi and Wertman, 1989: 225￿ 36). [...] At the local level, from
Palermo and Naples to Genoa and the Veneto, DC factions divided up and gov-
erned hospitals, welfare agencies, public utilities, credit agencies, housing and
construction agencies, chambers of commerce, cooperatives, industrial associa-
tions, and professional associations (Caciagli, 1977: Ch. 6; Tamburrano, 1974:
111￿ 16). Public entities proliferated to meet the expanding needs of the DC and
its factions.
2.3 Factions in Japan￿ s LDP
The LDP has led the Japanese national government almost continuously since the party￿ s
formation in 1955. The great majority of LDP politicians have been long-term members of
factions.8 These factions were called shidan (divisions) or gundan (army corps). Like Italian
factions, they were formal, hierarchical organizations. Bettcher (2005, p. 346) writes:
O¢ ces proliferated within the largest factions as they matured. These o¢ ces
had regular functions and procedures, which became standardized across the
di⁄erent factions (Ishikawa and Hirose, 1989: 212). The ￿rst of these was the
faction secretary-general (jimu socho), analogous to the secretary-general of the
party (in both the faction and the party the secretary-general was a di⁄erent
person from the leader). The secretary-general of each faction was entrusted
with the daily business of his faction, including keeping order in the faction and
handling relations with other factions. [...] Next was the standing secretariat
(jonin kanjikai), which determined a faction￿ s management policies. It met prior
to weekly faction meetings and then obtained approval of its decisions from the
full faction (Iseri, 1988: 30￿ 2, 34￿ 5; Ishikawa and Hirose, 1989: 213). Under the
standing secretariat were one or more bureaus (kyoku), charged with executing
8Turnover in factional membership decreased from the 1960s to the 1980s as the vast majority of the LDP￿ s
lower-house politicians became identi￿ed with a single faction. Defections from factions almost ceased after
1972. Once a politician was elected and joined a faction, his fate was usually tied to the same faction until
he died or retired. Bettcher (2005 p. 345)
7its internal policies. Some factions had specialized bureaus for handling policy
issues or elections. The secretariats and the bureaus were specialized, permanent,
hierarchical structures within the faction, governed by a set of written faction
rules. They curtailed the in￿ uence of the leader and diminished the impact of
his individual characteristics on the faction (Iseri, 1988: 32￿ 5).
As in Italy, Japanese factions were based on mutual dependence between patrons and clients.
This is illustrated by Cox et al. (2000, p. 116).
[F]action bosses [...] helped members get three crucial aids to re-election: the
party endorsement, ￿nancial backing, and party and governmental posts. In
return, the bosses received his follower￿ s support in the LDP presidential election,
which he could use either to pursue the party presidency himself or to trade for
other positions.
As in the Italian case, LDP factions have had an important in￿ uence on the distribution
of public expenditures. According to Scheiner (2005), p. 807-8, pork barrel spending is
targeted to the constituents of strong LDP factions.
[...] funding for local projects is often clearly targeted to LDP Diet members￿
￿nancial and political supporters, especially local politicians who deliver the vote
for the Diet members (Curtis, 1971; Mulgan, 2000, p. 81; Park, 1998a, 1998b).
2.4 Factions in Mexico￿ s PRI
Factions in Mexico are called ￿camarillas.￿They are less formal than Italian or Japanese
party factions, but they have been highly in￿ uential in the PRI, the party that dominated
Mexican politics from 1930-2000. Camarillas are based on personal ties of trust across
hierarchical levels, and members often share some element of their formative or professional
life.9 Camp (2003, p. 104) enumerates ￿Fifteen characteristics of Mexican Camarillas;￿we
select the seven most relevant to our analysis.
1. The structural basis of the camarilla system is a mentor-disciple relationship
2. Successful politicians initiate their own camarillas simultaneously with membership in
mentor￿ s camarillas
9They might share a university advisor, or have been colleagues in a previous position, etc. See Smith
(1979) for a wonderfully detailed study of camarillas.
83. Every major national ￿gure is the ￿political child,￿￿grandchild,￿or ￿great grandchild￿
of an earlier, nationally known ￿gure.
4. Politicians with kinship camarillas have advantages over peers without them.
5. The larger the camarilla, the more in￿ uential its leader and, likewise, his disciples.
6. Personal qualities generally determine disciples￿ties to a mentor.
7. It is acceptable to shift loyalties when the upward ascendancy of the political mentor
is frozen.
The two-way ties between patrons and clients in a camarilla are well-illustrated in the fol-
lowing description of the activities at CONASUPO, a public agricultural support agency.10
Grindle (1977) writes:
Through a number of high-level appointments, the director of CONASUPO made
friends among the leadership of the peasant and middle-class sectors of the party,
obligated a number of state governors, developed a following among university
students, and established friendships with o¢ cials in key government agencies.
The extent of the political support he accumulated in this manner made him a
valuable member of a political faction whose importance increased as it attempted
to in￿ uence the selection of the presidential candidate for 1976. If successful in
this maneuver, the director could expect to become a close collaborator of the
new president. His subordinates were aware of the advantages of ￿winning￿for
their own careers. ￿If he becomes a minister,￿commented one respondent, ￿then
his entire equipito will follow him and we￿ ll all have positions in the Ministry.￿
2.5 Factions in China￿ s CCP
The preceding examples are from well-developed democracies. Intra-party factions also op-
erate in systems with weaker democratic institutions. For example, in China￿ s CCP where
party politics is largely informal,11 factions play an important role. The Shanghai faction,
for example, associated with former president Jang Zemin, was (in)famous for its ability to
10CONASUPO had a broad mandate. See Yunez-Naude (2007, pp. 4-6).
11￿Unlike most Western countries, where formal politics is clearly dominant over informal politics [...] the
Chinese informal sector has been historically dominant, with formal politics often providing no more than
a facade. Informal politics plays an important part in every organization at every level, but the higher the
organization the more important it becomes. [...] This informal sphere is distinguished from relations within
the host organization as a whole by its more frequent contacts, greater degree of goal consensus, loyalty to
the informal group, and ability to work together.￿Cited from Dittmer (1995, pp. 16-17).
9secure state resources and party posts.12 It is not surprising, therefore, that a large literature
in Chinese politics studies factions.13 This literature invariably identi￿es factions as key for
understanding political power. Huang (2000, p. 77) writes:
A leader￿ s power is essentially based on the strength of his factional networks.
The leaders who have the most access to factional networks dominate
Chinese factions share many traits with their counterparts in Italy, Japan and Mexico. Huang
(2000, p. 76), identi￿es the following six characteristics of factional links in the CCP, many
of which resemble those of DC, LDP and PRI factions.
1. A factional linkage is secured by common political interests.
2. Its crux is the exchange of political obligations that concern the well-being of both
participants in a hierarchic context.
3. It is equally coercive on both participants. Abrogation by either of them can bring
about damage or even disaster to both participants.
4. Each participant holds a position of authority at a given level. But direct relations
usually exist only between the superior and his immediate inferiors.
5. A factional linkage is not inclusive. Although a leader can develop such linkages with
other followers so as to maximize his support, it will be disastrous for a follower to seek
multiple linkages with more than one leader. This would give a leader enough reason
to suspect his loyalty and hence to withdraw his protection.
6. It can be extended: both ends can be linked to the next higher or lower level of
authority in the same fashion.
The goods exchanged across CCP factional linkages are also similar to those from the preced-
ing examples. The superior (patron) rewards the inferior (client) with security/advancement,
and is repaid with support.
12￿A joke circulating throughout China since the late 1990s also re￿ ects public resentment of favoritism in
elite promotion. Whenever a line formed to get on a train or bus, people often teased: ￿ Let comrades from
Shanghai aboard ￿rst￿ .￿Li (2002).
13Cf. Huang (2000, p.1) who writes ￿Factionalism, a politics in which informal groups, formed on personal
ties, compete for dominance within their parent organization, is a well-observed phenomenon in Chinese
politics.￿
10The prime basis for factions among cadres is the search for career security and the
protection of power ... Thus the strength of the Chinese faction is the personal
relationship of individuals who, operating in a hierarchical context, create linkage
networks that extend upwards in support of particular leaders who are, in turn,
looking to their followers to ensure their power. Pye (1981, pp. 7-8)
Like factions of interest elsewhere, CCP factions seek rents from the central state admin-
istration and are thought to a⁄ect the distribution of public expenditures. Shanghai, for
example, is widely believed to have received a disproportionate share of central government
spending during the 1990￿ s as a result of factional imperatives. While systematic evidence
is di¢ cult to obtain, at least one study documents this e⁄ect. Shih (2004) collected proxies
for the factional ties among Chinese politicians and tested for the impact of factional ties on
the distribution of distribution of bank loans in reform-era China and ￿nds that factional
ties have an e⁄ect on the distribution of bank loans.
2.6 Factions in Chicago￿ s ￿Daley Machine￿
The Democratic Party in Chicago under mayor and party chairman Richard J. Daley (1955-
1976) is a well-studied example of factions operating inside a U.S. party ￿machine.￿During
the Daley era, the Chicago Democrats were organized along the administrative lines of the
city in hierarchical networks of clients and patrons. Chicago was divided into 50 wards,
each consisting of 50-60 voting precincts, with each precinct containing 400-600 registered
voters. Daley was the party￿ s chief executive. Beneath him were party committeemen,
and beneath them, with some overlap, were alderman ￿each representing a ward of the
city. Committeemen were party, not government, o¢ cials and each appointed a cadre of
precinct captains who reported to him. In addition, factional networks extended into the
city government bureaucracy through a vast number of patronage jobs tightly controlled by
the party. (Guterbock, 1980)
As in the previous examples, party members in Chicago made exchanges across patron-
client links; clients at lower ranks delivered votes for their patrons in exchange for personal
promotion and jobs for themselves and their constituents. Ultimately, a faction￿ s power
depended on its vote-getting ability and its in￿ uence with the highest echelons of the party:
￿In the heyday of the machine during the Daley years ... jobs were allocated
to ward and township committeemen in proportion to the individual commit-
teeman￿ s in￿ uence and the number of votes his ward delivered for machine can-
didates. [...]Generally, the committeemen parceled out the jobs they ￿owned￿
to their precinct captains on the basis of the captains￿ability to garner votes.
11If a captain failed to deliver his precinct, he could be ￿viced￿or ￿red from his
job. If his failure were less serious, he might only lose some of the jobs under his
control.￿Cited from Freedman (1994, p. 39).
In another example, Guterbock (1980, p. 27) describes the intra-party competition this way:
￿The ward committeeman has control over some 150 patronage jobs, and if he
continues to produce favorable election results, his patronage power will rise.
However, the ethnic identi￿cation of the [local party organization] limits its
power. The committeeman, alderman, ... and most of the leading precinct cap-
tains are Jewish. Their ethnicity prevents their wholehearted acceptance into the
inner circle of citywide party leaders, almost all of whom are Irish.￿
In addition to patronage jobs, party factions directed public resources to themselves and their
constituents by means of their control over city and county bureaucracies. One alderman
described the services o⁄ered by his network as follows:
￿Anybody in the 25th [ward] needs something, needs help with his garbage, needs
his street ￿xed, needs a lawyer for his kid who￿ s in trouble, he goes ￿rst to the
precinct captain... If the captain can￿ t deliver, that man can come to me. My
house is open every day to him.14￿
In another example, a City attorney and precinct captain explained how, in exchange for
votes, he worked to provide better public services, and indeed lower taxes for his constituents.
￿I consider myself a social worker for my precinct. I help my people get relief and
driveway permits. I help them on unfair parking ￿nes and property assessments.
The last is most e⁄ective in my neighborhood [middle class]. ￿The only return
I ask is that they register and vote. ... I never take lea￿ ets or mention issues or
conduct rallies in my precinct. After all, this is a question of personal friendship
between me and my neighbors...15￿
Overall, the party and its internal politics, more than the formal o¢ ces of government,
determined public spending:
￿It was through [Daley￿ s] control of the party, not his elective o¢ ce, that he
gained complete control of the city council ... Thus the mayor, not the council,
decided the budget; the mayor, not the council, really decided on the legislation
that ran the city.￿Allswang (1986, p. 143).
1425th Ward Alderman Vito Marzullo, quoted in ￿Ald. Vito Marzullo: Dispenser of Jobs,￿Chicago Daily
News, February 7, 1967.
15Quoted in Allswang (1986), page 141.
122.7 Summary: De￿ning Traits of Factions of Interest
These examples of factions present several common traits upon which our model is based:
1. Factions of interest are hierarchical networks of party members.
2. A faction member transacts mostly with his direct hierarchical superior (patron-client
relationship). The patron expects to be supported in his ascent to power. In return,
the patron gives the client resources that help advance (or at least secure) the client￿ s
position in the hierarchy.
3. Factions of interest do not typically coalesce around ideological or policy positions.
Instead, they are devoted primarily to the capture of public resources.
4. The existence of factions results in an allocation of resources that follows a factional
logic, not necessarily the welfare of the party as a whole, or any e¢ ciency criterion.
Along some dimensions, we see variation across the examples. The formality of the faction,
for example, ranges from high (Italy, Japan) to low (China). The system of factional com-
petition may be operated centrally almost as an incentive scheme (Chicago, by Daley), or it
may be the result of informal self-organization of competing groups (Mexico). The model in
the following sections is su¢ ciently general that it need not take a stand on these dimensions.
3 A Model of Intra-Party Allegiances
In this section we present the model. It is designed to accomplish, with a minimal amount
of complexity, two tasks:
1. Provide a framework to study the endogenous formation of factions: why party o¢ cers
belong to them, and why factions may persist over time.
2. Study the impact of factions on the allocation of resources.
To study of faction formation, we allow party o¢ cers to choose their factional partners.
To study persistence, we have this choice repeated in every period. It is important for the
existence of factions that the power to deliver public resources is distributed across the party.
We model this power as e⁄ort, and it is one of two elements of the quid-pro-quo that links
patron and client. The other element is support for promotion. To get at this second side
of the exchange, the model speci￿es a party charter that sets promotion rules.
133.1 Setup
Time is discrete and indexed by t: There are S states (localities), indexed by s; in each of
them an election takes place in every period. Two national parties compete in each election.
We focus on the internal workings of one of these parties, the party of the o¢ ce-holder. The
workings of the opposition party will be sketched only sparsely.16
3.2 Party and Party O¢ cers
A party is a series of positions that party o¢ cers wish to hold. Positions are characterized
by their rank. Rank r + 1 is senior to rank r, and r = 0 denotes the lowest possible rank.17
The number of positions of each rank is determined by the party charter, modeled below.
The main actors in our model are party o¢ cers. The party o¢ cers￿objective function is
myopic: they simply derive a given amount of utility (which we normalize to 1) from being
promoted to the next rank at the end of each period. O¢ cers can exert e⁄ort e in favor of
a state of their choice, which increases the probability that state receives a unit of a public
project. Also, o¢ cers can support one another for promotion according to the rules speci￿ed
in the party charter. These actions are detailed next.
3.3 Allegiances and E⁄ort: The Patron-Client Link
At the beginning of the period, o¢ cers make two sets of choices. First, o¢ cers declare one
state for which they will work and a set of patrons whom they will support for promotion.
After all allegiances are so determined, o¢ cers choose an e⁄ort level e that increases the
probability that a public project is provided to the state they declared.
Client￿ s support of patron The declaration process takes place sequentially in order
of rank, starting from the highest. When it is their turn, each party o¢ cer i of rank r ￿ 0







i ￿ 1, which represents the probability that i will support o¢ cer j for promotion.
All o¢ cers supported with positive probability by i must (a) have rank r + 1; and (b) have
declared the same state as i.
16The analysis could be symmetrically extended to the opposition party. We do not do so because we
think little would be gained in terms of economic insight.
17The positions may be in the party, or they could be positions in the government bureaucracy, for
example, if the party has power of patronage. The di⁄erent ranks need not be formal, with distinct titles
and authorities. Rather, the ranking is meant to capture, more broadly, the path by which an o¢ cer￿ s career
advances.
14We call o¢ cer i the ￿client￿and the o¢ cers he commits to support with positive probability
his ￿patrons.￿Conditions (a) and (b) make analysis of the strategic formation of patron-
client networks tractable. Condition (a) says that clients can only support patrons one rank
above them; condition (b) requires clients to devote their e⁄ort to the state chosen by their
patrons.
Patron￿ s support of client Next, each party o¢ cer simultaneously picks an e⁄ort
level e 2 [0;1] that increases the probability that a public project is provided to the state
he has declared. Putting in e⁄ort e costs the faction member c(e): The cost function c(￿) is
assumed to be convex, and c(0) = c0 (0) = 0.
E⁄ort has several interpretations, not mutually exclusive. First, e⁄ort may represent invest-
ment in a lobbying process by which faction members compete to divert public resources
toward their chosen state. Second, e⁄ort may represent fund raising activity on the part
of faction members. Finally, e⁄ort may capture the degree to which the o¢ cer resists the
temptation to skim public funds allocated to state s. As we will see, in equilibrium the
patron￿ s e⁄ort helps the client, and so represents the pro quo that is given in exchange for
the quid (support).
3.4 Elections and Public Projects
In each state and in every period there is an election in which the party candidate (who is the
rank-0 o¢ cer recruited into the party) runs against an opposition candidate. We abstract
from the details of this election for the moment and simply assume that the dominant party
candidate is more likely to win the election if his state is assigned an indivisible public
project.18 In each region the probability of electing the dominant party candidate increases
from bs to bs + ￿s when the public project is provided.
The probability that the public project is provided to state s depends on the sum of e⁄orts
devoted by party o¢ cers to that state. Let er denote the sum of all e⁄orts directed by o¢ cers
of rank r to region s. Then region s receives a public project with probability





or 1, whichever is smaller. The scalar ￿ is assumed to be smaller than 1. This assumption is
for technical convenience, it ensures that the summation converges. The assumption ￿ < 1
also implies that the e⁄ort of higher-ranking o¢ cers has less impact on the provision of public
resources. In Section 7.3 we discuss how to extend the analysis to the case where ￿ > 1.
18Behind this assumption is a model, sketched in Section 7.5 and detailed in Appendix C, of rational voters
who interpret the pre-electoral receipt of the public project as a signal.
15We need not take a stand here on whether the e⁄ort exerted in favor of state s is rival to
that exerted for other states. The public resources, denoted by g; may come from a ￿xed
pot that could be allocated to any state (e⁄ort is rival), or they may come from a pot that
is only available to state s (e⁄ort is non-rival).19
States with high bs are referred to as party ￿strongholds,￿and states with high ￿s as ￿swing￿
states. We assume for convenience that bs +￿s < 1; that is, the party can never be assured
of winning the election.
3.5 Party Charter: Recruitment, Promotions, and Exit
The party charter regulates recruitment, promotions, and exit from party cadres. Recruit-
ment occurs early in the period, promotions and exit at the end. We now o⁄er a simple
model of a charter.
Recruitment Recruitment takes place while allegiances are being declared. In each
state, the power to recruit in state s is granted to the highest-ranked o¢ cer who declared
for state s, provided that this o¢ cer won election in s at some point in the past. In this
case, the o¢ cer submits a new recruit, a rank-0 candidate that will represent the dominant
party in an election against the opposition in state s. If the highest-ranking o¢ cer never
won election in state s then he is not allowed to recruit and the election is lost by default.
Promotions Promotions are made at the end of each period, sequentially by rank
starting from the lowest. An o¢ cer who holds rank 0 is promoted to rank 1 if he won the
election in his state. An o¢ cer who held rank r > 0 in period t is promoted to rank r + 1
if he is supported by at least one o¢ cer who held rank r ￿ 1 during t and who was himself
promoted at the end of period t.
Exit O¢ cers who are not promoted lose their o¢ cer status forever (up or out).
This charter requires the recruiting o¢ cer for state s to have held elected o¢ ce in that state.
One interpretation of this requirement is that successful politicians in state s are better
able to pick a candidate that is a good ￿t for state s. An important implication of this
19One might be concerned that the interpretation of rival e⁄ort is not proper here, because probability (1)
does not depend on the e⁄ort towards states other than s; but the rival interpretation is proper. Expression
(1) can be recovered as the limit probability of winning a prize in a tournament in which N factions compete
for qN prizes (q < 1), when the number of competing factions N becomes large. So expression (1) does not
preclude the interpretation of factions competing for a ￿xed amount of public spending. For the details of
this argument see Appendix A. This interpretation notwithstanding, when a party o¢ cer works on behalf
of another, that e⁄ort undoubtedly results in a net gain of resources commanded by the party as a whole.
16assumption, as we shall see, is that in equilibrium the head of the faction attached to state
s will need to have been elected in state s:
The promotion rules imply, for example, that o¢ cer i of rank 2 can be promoted only
if a rank-0 o¢ cer is elected who supported an o¢ cer of rank 1 who, in turn, supports
o¢ cer i. Note that the party cadres necessarily have a pyramidal structure: there are fewer
o¢ cers at higher ranks, because every o¢ cer who gets promoted can propel up at most
one other o¢ cer of rank immediately superior. The charter can thus be seen as a rough
approximation of a process of representative democracy within the party, where o¢ cers are
selected for assemblies of di⁄erent ranks, and the selectorate of the rank r assembly is rank
r ￿ 1 assembly. Alternatively, the promotion rule can capture an informal process in which
o¢ cers require the support of the other o¢ cers (in our case, the cadres just below them)
in order to maintain or increase their position within the party. We view this assumption
as factually uncontroversial, since in reality promotions are typically determined by party
assemblies and/or simply by informal support within party ranks.
3.6 Timeline
At time t:
￿ Sequentially, starting from the highest rank, party o¢ cers declare the state that they
will work for and whom they support for promotion.
￿ A (rank-0) candidate is recruited in each state.
￿ Party o¢ cers simultaneously choose the e⁄ort devoted to procuring public resources.
￿ The public project is realized in each state according to the distribution (1).
￿ In every state, elections take place between the ruling party and the opposition.
￿ Promotions are made sequentially in order of rank, starting from the lowest.
4 Unitary Party Benchmark
In the standard, unitary-party model, a given budget is allocated across localities to maximize
the sum of the probabilities of winning.20 (See e.g. Lindbeck and Weibull 1987). Our analysis
nests as a special case the allocation implemented in that model.
20Considering other objectives for the party, such as winning a majority of the districts, would not quali-
tatively change the results.
17We obtain the standard allocation by restricting ￿ = 0: In this case, power is not distributed
across the party hierarchy: only the e⁄ort exerted by rank-0 o¢ cers matters for procuring
public resources. Let us therefore focus on the behavior of these o¢ cers. The rank-0 o¢ cer
in state s chooses e to maximize the probability of winning the election minus the cost of
e⁄ort,
max
e bs + ￿s ￿ e ￿ c(e):






In this allocation, swing localities receive resources in proportion to their responsiveness
(￿s); and the baseline level of support for the party (bs) does not a⁄ect the allocation.
These properties of the resource allocation are the hallmarks standard models of distributive
politics.
In our speci￿c setup, the unitary party paradigm has even stronger predictions, because the
return to allocating resources to a locality is linear (with slope ￿s). This implies that, in a
unitary party, resources would be allocated maximally (e = 1) to all localities with ￿s larger
than a threshold, and no resources would go to the other localities. This allocation, too, can
be achieved in our model by restricting the cost function c(￿) to be linear.21
Thus we see that our analysis nests as a special case the allocation that is implemented in
the conventional unitary-party models of distributive politics. In this special case ￿ = 0;
that is, power is not distributed vertically in the party organization. In what follows we
study the case when power is distributed vertically, that is, ￿ > 0:
5 Determining the Allegiance Network
The model described above is a dynamic network formation game. In this section we char-
acterize the equilibrium of this game. In equilibrium, support is pro⁄ered between o¢ cers of
adjacent ranks, giving rise to networks of mutual support. When these networks of support
hold fast across periods we call them factions. The results of this section provide formal
answers to some of the questions we raised in the introduction: What are party factions,
how do they form, and how do they persist despite the incentives for o¢ cers from weaker
factions to defect into more powerful ones?
21The slope of the linear function c(￿) corresponds to the shadow price of resources in the optimal allocation
for the unitary party model.
185.1 Networks: Preliminaries
We start by de￿ning a network. A network is a group of o¢ cers linked by bonds of support.
De￿nition 1 Two o¢ cers i and j are linked if p
j
i > 0: A network is a set of party o¢ cers
(network members) each of whom is linked to another member, none of whom is linked to a
non-member, and which does not contain any other network.
This de￿nition partitions the set of party o¢ cers into distinct networks.22 We now charac-
terize certain features of equilibrium networks.
Lemma 1 (Characterization of networks)
a. A network contains o¢ cers of every rank between the minimum and the maximum rank
in the network.
b. All members of a network must exert e⁄ort for the same state.
c. In equilibrium, a network will contain at most one rank-0 member of that state; only
members of the network including the rank-0 member have a positive probability of being
promoted.
d. If the network survives into the next period, in equilibrium at most one network member
of each rank is actually promoted.
Proof. Part a. Suppose the network had members of rank greater and smaller than r, but
no members of rank r. Then we could partition it into two smaller networks, a violation of
the de￿nition that a network may not contain another network.
Part b. follows because all members in a network are linked.
To prove the ￿rst statement in c., suppose a network comprised two rank-0 members. Then
one of the two rank-0 members is not able to work for his state (by de￿nition no two network
members can work for di⁄erent states), which means his chance of being promoted is bs. But
then he would be better o⁄ by splitting o⁄ and forming a single-member network, because
then he would be able to work and increase his probability of promotion. To prove the second
statement in c., observe that in equilibrium the rank-0 o¢ cer for state s can only belong to
one network ’. Consider any other network ’0 that works for state s: At promotion time in
period t; the lowest ranked o¢ cer(s) in network ’0 have rank greater than zero and will not
be supported by anyone, so by party charter they cannot be promoted. But then nobody
above them in network ’0 can be promoted.
22In the network literature, what we call network is usually called a component.
19Part d. follows from c. and the rules in the party charter. ￿
By Lemma 1, any network that has a positive probability of survival can be uniquely identi-
￿ed by the state for which its members work. Conversely, every state has a network, albeit
possibly a very small one (of size 1).
We now introduce a result that, while straightforward, o⁄ers insight as it highlights the force
that drives the formation of patron-client links, and thus of networks. The result roughly
says that if a client supports a set of patrons at all, he will o⁄er his support completely.
Lemma 2 (Power of clientele fully expended) If there is at least one o¢ cer of a rank





Proof. Consider rank-1 o¢ cer i in a network which includes a rank-0 member. If o¢ cer
i is supported in equilibrium by the rank-0 member, that is in part because the rank-0
member values the support that member i provides to rank-2 members. So o¢ cer i cannot
decrease the support he receives from the rank-0 member by scaling up his p
j
i￿ s proportionally
until their sum equals 1. At the same time, by scaling up the p
j
i￿ s, o¢ cer i increases the
e⁄ort exerted by rank-2 members and thus increases the probability that the whole network
survives. For both reasons, then, scaling up the p
j
i￿ s is a dominant strategy. The same
reasoning applies to every o¢ cer of rank i > 1: ￿
The intuition for this result is straightforward: by o⁄ering his support to a patron, the
client makes himself valuable both to the patron and to his own clients. This increases the
patron￿ s incentives to exert e⁄ort on his behalf, and leads his own clients to support him
more strongly. This result suggests that the incentive to create patron-client networks is
pervasive in our model.23
5.2 Patterns of Allegiance and E⁄ort Maximization
Now, with a basic understanding of the characteristics of equilibrium networks, we turn to
investigate further questions of network structure. In this subsection, we are concerned with
the network structure that maximizes e⁄ort by its members, and the payo⁄s to current net-
work members from adding a new member. The answers to these questions will, ultimately,
explain the stability of various networks and thus how factions form and persist.
If a network has more than one o¢ cer per rank, allegiance could be distributed in many ways
among these o¢ cers. All members of that rank could be supported equally, for example,
23This result does not mean that all o¢ cers need be clients of some patron, because the putative client
may wish to exert e⁄ort on behalf of a state for which a patron is not available. In that case, the putative
client may opt instead to start his own network.
20or only one could be supported. How support is distributed obviously in￿ uences e⁄ort; if,
for example, o¢ cer j is not supported by any network member, then he has no chance of
promotion and so will exert no e⁄ort. In this section we ask how to allocate the available
support in order to maximize the total e⁄ort produced by the network.
Lemma 3 Consider a network and vary only the distribution of support among its rank-r
members. If c000 < 0; then total e⁄ort produced by all its rank-r members is maximal when
just one rank-r member is supported. If c000 > 0; then total e⁄ort produced by all its rank-r
members is maximal when all rank-r members are supported with the equal probability.
Proof. Suppose there are J network members of rank r, and let ej denote the e⁄ort put
forth by the j-th network member (we omit the index r because it is constant throughout the
proof). Let ￿j denote the support that the j-th network member receives, i.e., the probability
that the member is promoted conditional on the election in his state being won. We are
looking for the constellation of ￿j￿ s that maximizes total e⁄ort
P
j ej under the constraint
that
P
j ￿j = 1. The constraint re￿ ects the total amount of support that emanates from
rank r ￿ 1: Start by observing that ej solves
max
ej ￿
j [b + ￿Pr(g = 1)] ￿ c(e
j):














where we have used the fact that
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j s.t. h(e1;:::;eJ) = 1
ej ￿ 0
The function h is symmetric and so is the objective function, thus the solution depends on
the Hessian of h. If its Hessian is negative de￿nite then the function h is concave; since h
is an increasing function, the solutions to our problem are extremal points, i.e., all but one
ej are zero. This allocation can be achieved by setting all ￿j￿ s to zero but one; that is, by
supporting only one network member. The Hessian is negative de￿nite when c000 < 0.
21If instead c000 > 0 then the Hessian of h is positive de￿nite, and the function h is convex.
In this case, the objective function is maximized when all ej￿ s are positive and equal. This
allocation can be achieved by setting all ￿j￿ s equal to 1=J; that is, by supporting all network
members equally. ￿
This result suggests that within-rank competition increases total e⁄ort only when c000 > 0: If
instead c000 < 0, then job security is more e⁄ective. Although the previous result is a ￿partial
equilibrium￿result because it characterizes only the e⁄ort produced within a given rank, the
result helps characterize the e⁄ort-maximizing structure for the entire network.
Proposition 1 (E⁄ort-maximizing network structure). If c000 < 0; then among all
networks covering the same ranks, total e⁄ort is maximal in the network with one member
per rank. If c000 > 0; then total e⁄ort is increasing in the number of members per rank.
Proof. Due to the linearity of expression (1), the equilibrium e⁄ort of network members
of rank r does not depend on the e⁄ort of network members of di⁄erent rank. Thus, the
incentive design problem can be solved rank by rank. The result then follows from the
previous Lemma: ￿
While within-rank competition is sometimes e⁄ort-maximizing, not all network members
will appreciate the competition. Indeed, we now show that network members always dislike
competition within their own rank.
Lemma 4 Consider a network and vary only the number J of its rank-r members. Assume
all rank r members are supported with equal probability. Then the payo⁄ of a rank r member
is decreasing in J:
Proof. Since the two networks are identical at ranks di⁄erent from r; the total e⁄ort put
forth by ranks di⁄erent from r is unchanged as J varies. We can therefore restrict attention
to that portion of payo⁄s that re￿ ects the e⁄ort put forth by rank r members. For a member
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where 1=J is the support enjoyed by each rank-r member, and eJ￿ denotes the equilibrium
















22Note that, by construction, for any e we have RJ (e;e) = RJ+1 (e;e): Note further that for



















This results suggests that no member would want to enlarge his network by admitting a
new member at his own rank. When c000 > 0; however, members would like to enlarge the
network by admitting new members at all ranks but their own.
5.3 Permanent Allegiances: Factions and Factional Equilibrium
Networks need not be stable over time. For example, one network might o⁄er so high a
survival prospect that in every period members from all other networks would like to defect
into it. In this subsection we introduce a notion of stable networks, factions. Factions are
cohesive networks of o¢ cers that support each other period after period, until their network￿ s
demise. When all networks are stable, we call it a factional equilibrium. In the results that
follow we provide conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a factional equilibrium. In
this way, we provide a formal answer to the question: why do factions persist despite the
incentives for o¢ cers from weaker factions to defect?
De￿nition 2 A faction is a network in which o¢ cers always exert e⁄ort for the same state
and no o¢ cer ever alters his links. A factional equilibrium is an equilibrium in which all
networks are factions.
The structure of factions can be immediately characterized as a corollary of Lemmas 1 and
2.
Corollary 1 In any factional equilibrium, after the ￿rst period:
a. all factions will have exactly 1 member per rank.
b. in every faction and in every period each client fully supports the same patron.
c. in each period all factions either grow by one member or else they collapse.
Figure 1 depicts an example of the evolution of factions between period t and t + 1: In this
example the faction in state 3 collapses, while the others survive (and grow by 1 member).
To ensure that a factional equilibrium exists, we need to check that there are no incentives
for o¢ cers to defect from their faction.
23States
1       2       3       4
Time t Time t+1
1       2       3       4
Figure 1: Evolution of factions between periods.
De￿nition 3 A defector is an o¢ cer who, in a given period, switches the faction for which
he works.
Obviously, a factional equilibrium admits no defectors. The temptation to defect is stronger
for members of small factions, who face a relatively low probability of winning the election.
A member of a small faction may wish to increase his probability of promotion by defecting
to a larger one. In addition, members will be tempted to defect to particularly ￿safe￿states,
if they exist. When neither of these temptations is too strong, a factional equilibrium exists.
Moreover, a defector may not necessarily be allowed into a di⁄erent faction. Then again, a
factional equilibrium exists.
Proposition 2 A factional equilibrium exists under the following conditions:
a. if c000 < 0; because then defectors will not be accepted.
b. if ￿ is su¢ ciently small, all the bs are su¢ ciently similar, and all the ￿s are su¢ ciently
similar; because then no faction member will wish to defect to another faction.
Proof. The e⁄ort choice in a factional equilibrium is pinned down by equation (2), since
each client only has one patron and ￿j = 1: What remains to be determined is the pattern of
allegiance; that is, we need to check if there is incentive for faction members to defect from
faction ’ of state s to faction ’0 of state s0: Say faction ’0 has maximum rank K: Then no
member of faction ’ with rank greater than K will defect to ’0; because then the highest-
ranking member of the faction will not have been elected in state s and so, by assumption,
24will not be able to nominate a rank-0 candidate. We will check for incentives to deviate on
the part of members of rank lower than K:
a. An o¢ cer of rank r in faction ’ might consider defecting to faction ’0 if he is guaranteed
some positive probability of being supported by that faction￿ s r ￿ 1-rank member. His
defection might trigger other defections, possibly all the way down to members of rank
1. Consider then the lowest rank member to defect in any given period. In order for his
defection to be pro￿table, it must be rewarded by a positive probability of being supported
by the r ￿ 1 rank member of faction ’0: That faction member will not, however, divide his
support between his former patron and the defector, because by Proposition 3 that would
decrease the aggregate e⁄ort produced by rank r of the faction, without a⁄ecting the e⁄ort
put forth by any other rank in the faction. Thus, r￿1 rank member￿ s best response towards
a defector is either to not support him at all or to fully support him. Let us select the
equilibrium in which this indi⁄erence is resolved against the defector. Then the defection
would be turned down and the potential defector does not defect. Thus there cannot be a
lowest-ranked defector, which shows that there is a factional equilibrium.
b. When ￿ is small, the e⁄ort of faction members of ranks 1 or higher has little e⁄ect on the
probability of delivering the public good. Thus all factions, regardless of their rank, promote
with approximately the same probability as a faction of rank 1. If all the bs are su¢ ciently
similar and all the ￿s are su¢ ciently similar, then no o¢ cers in faction ’ would want to
defect to faction ’0; as that would cut their probability of promotion in half. ￿
The reason for the conditions in part b. of the above proposition is straightforward. Members
of small factions generally have an incentive to switch to large factions in order to free-ride
on the e⁄ort of the larger group, unless ￿ is su¢ ciently small, in which case the e⁄ort of
ranks higher than 1 has a negligible impact and so faction size, beyond size 2, does not much
a⁄ect the probability of promotion. The reason why we need the bs to be similar is that
if, for example, b1 > 2(b2 + ￿); the conditions in faction 1 are simply too attractive for a
member of faction 2 to resist defecting.24
The su¢ cient conditions provided in Proposition 2 are somewhat restrictive. One reason that
they need to be stringent is that we have assumed no barriers to entry into a new faction,
save the possibility that the defector may not be supported. In reality, the faction may
have the power to screen defectors from other factions. A social choice problem then arises,
because faction members might have con￿ icting views as to whether to accept defectors;
indeed Lemma 4 establishes that there is always some member who is against accepting a
defector. So, if all faction members have veto power over whether to accept defectors, then
no defector will ever be accepted and a factional equilibrium exists.
24We assume here that the defector to faction 1 will receive a utility of at least b1=2; as would be the case
if, for example, c000 > 0:
25Proposition 3 If faction members have veto power over the acceptance of defectors, then a
factional equilibrium exists.
Consistent with the view that factions face a collective decision problem concerning defec-
tors, Cox et al. (1999) observe that an informal norm against accepting defectors prevailed
in Japan￿ s LDP, precisely to protect the interest of those faction members who would be
displaced by the defector.25 This norm e⁄ectively functions as a veto power.
5.4 Uniqueness of Factional Equilibrium
Under an additional assumption, the factional equilibrium is unique. The additional as-
sumption needed to prove this result is the following.
A1 When indi⁄erent between his patrons, the client will support most the one who worked
for his current state in the previous period (if available).
This assumption captures mild intertemporal ties between a party o¢ cer and other o¢ cers
who worked for his current state in the previous period. It may not be immediately clear
what indi⁄erences Assumption A1 resolves. To understand the content of the assumption,
observe that when a client has two patrons, say, he may wish to support one patron with
probability 2/3 and the other with probability 1/3; but, he is indi⁄erent as to whom should
get the 2/3. Assumption A1 says that the client will resolve this indi⁄erence in favor of the
patron who worked for the same state in the previous period. In this sense, Assumption A1
resolves indi⁄erence on the client￿ s part.
Proposition 4 Suppose Assumption A1 holds, and that either of these conditions hold.
a. c000 < 0
b. network members have the power to veto member(s) according to the mechanism described
in Appendix B.
Then the factional equilibrium is the unique equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix B. ￿
25￿[S]ince the mid 1960s each faction￿ s posts have been allocated largely on the basis of seniority. Thus,
a prospective faction-jumper would want to ensure that his new faction would honour his seniority. But
honouring a new member￿ s seniority would be a delicate matter, because those further back in the seniority
queue might complain.￿Cited from Cox et al. (1999), p. 38.
266 Resource Allocation in Factional Equilibrium
Having described the forces that generate a factional equilibrium, we now want to charac-
terize the allocation of resources that emerges. Towards this end, we begin by establishing
some properties of the size and e⁄ort of factions in equilibrium. We omit the state index s
when no confusion can arise.
6.1 Faction e⁄ort for given faction size
In a factional equilibrium, within each state s at time t the party has a faction with exactly
one member per rank. We may therefore identify a faction member with his rank r. Let
R ￿ 0 denote the number of faction members. Member r solves
max
er

















r) = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿
r: (3)
The e⁄ort of a faction member is therefore increasing in ￿ and does not depend on b: Also,
equation (3) does not depend on R, so member r will put in e￿
r independent of his faction￿ s
size. Therefore, the total e⁄ort put forth by a faction is increasing in the faction￿ s size. We
summarize these observations in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 In a factional equilibrium, the e⁄ort of a faction member is increasing in ￿
and does not depend on b: The total e⁄ort of a faction is increasing in its size.
6.2 Steady State Distribution of Faction Size
The equilibrium of our network-formation game depends on the size of factions at time zero.
However, the e⁄ect of these initial conditions dissipates with time. This makes it possible to
avoid the e⁄ect of initial conditions and focus on the long-run properties of the equilibrium.
In this section we characterize the long-run distribution of faction size.
In a factional equilibrium the probability of a faction being of size R + 1 in period t + 1
equals the probability of being size R in period t times the transition probability. Formally,
￿t+1 (R + 1) = ￿t (R) ￿
"









27At a stationary equilibrium ￿t (￿) = ￿ (￿), so the stationary distribution can be characterized
by the following di⁄erence equation:
￿ (R + 1) = ￿ (R) ￿
"













Since by assumption b + ￿ < 1; we have that ￿ (R) < ￿ (R + 1) for all R: Figure 2 provides


















Figure 2: Steady-state distribution ￿ of faction size in state s:
We now show that swing states, and states with a large base of support for the party, are
more likely to have large factions.
Proposition 6 Increasing ￿ and/or b results in a ￿rst-order stochastically dominant shift
of the steady-state distribution of faction size.
Proof. Suppose ￿ increases. Then by equation (3), e￿
r increases for all r: From equation
(4), then, the new steady-state size distribution ￿0 has the property that
￿0 (R + 1)
￿0 (R)
>
￿ (R + 1)
￿ (R)
: (5)
It cannot be that ￿0(0) ￿ ￿ (0); because then we would have ￿0(R) > ￿ (R) for all R > 0
and then both distributions ￿ and ￿0 could not sum to 1. So it must be ￿0(0) < ￿ (0); and
28then equation (5) implies that there is a unique value R such that ￿0(R) < ￿ (R) if and only
if R < R. This establishes that ￿0 ￿rst-order stochastically dominates ￿:
If b increases, e￿
r does not change for any r; and equation (5) again holds. The previous
reasoning then proves the result. ￿
6.3 Resource Allocation
This section establishes three main points. First, in a factional equilibrium the allocation of
resources re￿ects the power of the faction. Second, and related, there is a systematic bias
in favor of party strongholds. Third, factions generate persistence in the resource allocation.
The next proposition makes these points and moreover, in points c.-e., it draws out several
additional implications for the allocation of public resources.
Proposition 7 (Allocation of resources in factional equilibrium) In a factional equi-
librium the probability that a state receives public resources depends on the size of its faction.
Through this channel the following results arise in our model:
a. In steady state, swing states (higher ￿) and party strongholds (higher b) are more likely
to receive public resources from the party.
b. In steady state, given two states with the same b and ￿; the state with a longer spell of
uninterrupted electoral success for the party is more likely to receive public resources from
the party.
c. The probability that a state receives public resources from the party at time t is predicted
by the future success within the party of the o¢ cer who holds rank 0 at time t.
d. Conditional on winning election at time t, the vote-getting ability of a rank-0 o¢ cer is
uncorrelated with the probability that his constituents receive public resources from the party
in the future.
e. Conditioning on faction size at time t eliminates all the e⁄ects described in parts a.-d.,
except for the e⁄ect of ￿ in part a. States that are dominated by the opposition (faction size
at time t is equal zero) receive no resources from the party at time t.
Proof. According to Proposition 5, the probability that a state receives the public project
given faction size R is an increasing function of R. This proves the introductory statement.
Proving of part a. requires averaging out faction size. The probability that a state receives
the public project conditional on faction size R is an increasing function of R. Taking an
average of this function using the steady-state distribution of R yields the probability that
a state receives the public project. By Proposition 6, that distribution is stochastically
29increasing in b: Thus states with higher b have a higher probability of receiving the public
project. The same argument applies to states with larger ￿; and in addition factions in those
states will exert more e⁄ort (Proposition 5), which establishes the result for those states.
Proof of part b. is immediate.
To prove part c., let B = b + ￿ and
P￿ = (party wins at t + 1;:::;￿jparty wins at t):
Then we can write
Pr(gt = 1joutgoing rank-0 o¢ cer at t promoted through ￿)
= Pr(gt = 1jparty wins at t;t + 1;:::;￿)
=
Pr(party wins at t;t + 1;:::;￿jgt = 1) ￿ Pr(gt = 1)
Pr(party wins at t;t + 1;:::;￿)
=
P￿ ￿ Pr(party wins at tjgt = 1) ￿ Pr(gt = 1)
P￿ ￿ Pr(party wins at t)
=
B Pr(gt = 1)
B Pr(gt = 1) + bPr(gt = 0)
>
[(1 ￿ B) + B (1 ￿ P￿)]Pr(gt = 1)
[(1 ￿ B) + B (1 ￿ P￿)]Pr(gt = 1) + [(1 ￿ b) + b(1 ￿ P￿)]Pr(gt = 0)
= Pr(gt = 1joutgoing rank-0 o¢ cer at t not promoted through ￿) (6)
The inequality follows from algebraic manipulation.
Part d. Regardless of whether the politician was an e⁄ective vote-getter when running for
o¢ ce, conditional on having been elected, in our model his vote-getting ability is irrelevant
for his future role in the life of the faction. In particular, the state of a rank-0 o¢ cer that
barely managed to get elected is just as likely to receive public goods as one with an o¢ cer
that was elected by a large margin.
Part e. Immediate. ￿
Part b. of the above proposition indicates that resource allocation is persistent. States
with a longer spell of uninterrupted electoral success for the party are more likely to receive
public resources. This is because such states have larger factions. By the same token, failure
to receive resources is also persistent, because it makes it more likely that the faction is
eliminated.
The stark no-correlation result obtained in Part d. is a consequence of the assumption that
party members never again run for o¢ ce. Were we to allow an outgoing rank-0 o¢ cer to
run for o¢ ce again, we would likely observe some correlation. Interestingly, however, we will
see some evidence of this lack of correlation in the Mexican case study where re-election is
precluded. One interpretation of this ￿nding is that, in Mexico, the vote-getting ability of
politicians plays a secondary role in their political careers after the governorship.
307 Discussion and Extensions
7.1 Obstacles to Factional Politics and the U.S. Case
It is important to point out that national parties in the U.S. do not have notable factions of
interest.26 Why is that? And more generally, what determines the degree to which a party
is divided into factions of interest? We shall attempt to answer these questions next.
Party Dominance Electorally dominant parties are more likely to develop factions. It
is no coincidence that all the parties mentioned in Section 2 have been in power for long
spells￿ many decades. Dominance breeds factions for several related reasons. First, from the
point of view of a party o¢ cer, holding rank r is more valuable if a party is now in power, is
likely to be in power soon, and is likely to be in power in the future. In this sense, the rewards
that induce factional behavior are more powerful in dominant parties. Second, and related,
a party that is in o¢ ce for extended periods is able to penetrate government bureaucracies.
In this way, non-political positions in state enterprises, public administration, regulated
businesses, etc., become part of the party reward system￿ ranks, in our terminology. Third,
the negative e⁄ects of factional organization on resource allocation (as spending is diverted
from swing states) are less important if, for some reason, a party does not fear electoral
competition.
These observations may partly explain why factions of interest are relatively rare in U.S.
national parties, which tend to alternate in power. In contrast, factions can be found in
the state Democratic parties in the post-civil-war South (see Key 1949) and in city political
machines, both of which continuously held power for extended periods of time.
Control over Nominations A key determinant of whether factions are strong or weak
is the control that the factions have over nominations. Are factions able to choose new
party o¢ cers? That depends on both party and legal rules. In this section we introduce the
concept of loyalty to the faction, and use it to show the importance of nomination control
for faction strength.
De￿nition 4 The loyalty of a party o¢ cer is the probability ￿ that the client will keep the
commitment to support his patron.
Until now we have assumed perfect loyalty. When we allow imperfect loyalty, aggregate
factional e⁄ort becomes a function of loyalty.
26Factions of principle are, however, common within national parties. The Republican Party, for example,
is divided into Reagan Republicans, Rockefeller Republicans, the Religious Right, etc.
31Proposition 8 Aggregate factional e⁄ort is monotonic in loyalty: when the loyalty of a
rank-r member decreases, equilibrium e⁄ort of faction members with rank R > r decreases.
Proof. Let ￿r ￿ 1 denote the loyalty of the rank-r o¢ cer. Then the support ￿R that
the faction member of rank R receives, i.e., the probability that the member is promoted










r ) = ￿
r￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿
r:
Clearly, the lower ￿r; the lower e￿￿
r . ￿
Loyalty of 0-rank candidates is highly valued by fellow faction members, because disloyal
candidates reduce their likelihood of being promoted. If recruitment is controlled by the
faction, then, we should expect high-loyalty candidates to be picked. By the same token,
the long-term viability of factions also depends on their ability to control nominations.27
Consistent with this view, in Italy￿ s DC and Japan￿ s LDP, factions e⁄ectively had control
over nominations and jealously guarded it.28 Conversely in the U.S., where nominations are
usually decided in primaries, factions are not overly strong.29
27If some other entity￿ the president, or the public￿ nominates candidates, those candidate are likely to
be loyal to those entities. On this point, see Cox et al. (1999).
28Regarding Italy￿ s DC, Zuckerman (1975, p. 33) writes:
It would seem that in regions where a national faction leader is present other political patrons
or aspiring patrons will associate with his faction. [...] In regions where there are two patrons
seeking national prominence, each will associate with a di⁄erent national faction.
In Japan, particularly before the 1994 reform, nominations were decided in national-level negotiations in
Tokyo. Cox et al. (1999, p. 40) write:
The factions competed just as ￿ercely over endorsements as they did over posts, seeking both
to secure nominations for their own non-incumbents and to protect their incumbents from the
appearance of endorsed non-incumbents in their districts.
29In the US system, due largely to legal constraints, national parties have relatively little say in the
nomination for congress. Instead, primaries typically devolve that power to the mass of party members. For
all major o¢ ces, candidate selection is by primary, with the right to participate as a candidate or as a voter
beyond the control of party organization. (Katz and Kolodny 1994, p. 31). Concerning the weakening e⁄ect
of primaries on party discipline, see generally V. O. Key (1958), Ch. 14.
32The U.S. Case In U.S. party politics, it is important to distinguish between national
parties and state and local party organizations. We mentioned above that neither national
party is dominant in the U.S., which makes it is less likely that factions would develop
in national party organizations. There are other reasons, too. From the perspective of
career concerns, national parties are small numerically and relatively in￿ uential in the U.S.
compared to state parties.30 This makes them less appealing as a target for politicians
intent on building networks. In addition, U.S. national parties have peculiar institutions at
the national level whereby committee chairmanships, which confer great power of patronage,
are assigned by seniority. Thus, access to these powerful posts does not require politicians
to marshal the support of other party members. For all these reasons, factional politics does
not develop at the national party level. If we are looking for factions of interest, therefore,
we must look in the state parties and at the local level. Again, this is indeed where factions
are found, for example in local party machines, or in the state parties of the U.S. south.
7.2 Bene￿ts of Factional Politics: Incentivizing E⁄ort
In our model, the party charter conditions promotion on the support of other party members.
In a factional equilibrium, this promotion rule gives rise to an incentive system which links
the fate of all o¢ cers to the outcome of elections, including those who are not directly
involved. This link has the virtue for the party of incentivizing these o¢ cers. To make this
point, we now analyze the case of a party charter in which promotions do not depend at all
on the support of the lower rungs of the faction. We will ￿nd that factions collapse and the
party is worse o⁄ for that. In this sense, then, factional politics is bene￿cial for the party.
Suppose the promotion of faction member r does not depend on r￿1￿ s backing, because the
party charter does not require internal support for promotions.31 Then there is no reason
why a member of rank r > 0 should exert e⁄ort and thus e￿
r = 0. Then the probability that
the party wins the election in state s is simply bs:
Proposition 9 (Value of the faction). If the promotion of faction member r does not de-
pend on r￿1￿ s support or, equivalently, if promotions are independent of electoral outcomes,
then faction members will exert no e⁄ort and the party will be less successful in elections.
This proposition does not imply that factions are the optimal incentive scheme. If promotions
could be conditioned explicitly on e⁄ort, for example, then the party could achieve better
30In part this may be due to the federal organization of the U.S government.￿ for example, elected positions
at the federal level, while often very important, are only 600, compared to more than 500,000 elected positions
at the state and local level (Katz and Kolodny (1994), p. 27.).
31The promotion and enlargement of a faction might depend, say, on the whim of a president who may
value personal favors, or practice nepotism, rather than rewarding electoral success.
33results. Some element of factional behavior, however, must be part of the optimal incentive
scheme, in the sense that party members must be induced to exert e⁄ort collectively on
behalf of the party in di⁄erent states.
7.3 Power Throughout the Hierarchy
We have assumed in our model that the e⁄ort of members of higher rank has less e⁄ect
on the provision of public projects. In this section we show that this is merely a technical
assumption and explain how to do without it.
The assumption we want to relax is that ￿ < 1 in expression (1). The role of that assumption
is to ensure that the expression sums to less than 1, and thus can be interpreted as a
probability. This assumption can be avoided, at the cost of some slight complication. To see
how, suppose we replace expression (1) with the following expression:












where ￿ > 1 and T is a positive integer of our choice. This expression meets our desideratum:
the e⁄ort exerted by o¢ cers of a higher rank counts for more.
This expression is almost as tractable as expression (1) because it is linear in the er when it
is below 1. And, for factions with less than T members, expression (7) is de￿nitely smaller
than 1 (remember that, in a faction, er < 1). So the behavior of members of factions with
rank smaller than T is very similar to that described in our model: larger factions exert more
aggregate e⁄ort and are more likely to survive. Notice that T can be chosen very large, so
that for all of the factions most of the time all our analysis goes through. When the size of the
faction exceeds T it is possible that Pr(g = 1) = 1: In that case many combinations of e⁄ort
among faction members can be an equilibrium, and then the analysis becomes somewhat
more cumbersome. But, from the point of view of the evolution of factions, it is not that
di¢ cult: factions that exceed a certain number of members get the public project for sure,
and so they survive with probability b+￿: Thus, nothing substantial in our analysis hinges
on the assumption that ￿ < 1:
7.4 Global Public Goods
If a party is forced by its factions to distribute many local public goods to in￿ uence local
elections, fewer resources may remain to woo voters with promises of public goods in nation-
wide elections. Thus, we expect parties with strong factions to promise fewer global public
goods; their appeal will be based mostly on their ability to procure local public goods.
34To make this point, denote by E the total amount of e⁄ort put forth by all the party￿ s
factions. Imagine that a fraction v of this e⁄ort results in local public expenditure that
could otherwise go toward promising global public goods in national elections (appropriations
from a federal budget, say), with the balance (1 ￿ v) representing resources that could not
be used for that purpose (the creation of patronage posts in a local hospital, say). Consider
the problem of a party president running for nation-wide o¢ ce. Let us assume that the
party president balances the goals of winning local elections with that of winning national
o¢ ce. From the party president￿ s point of view, increasing the portion (1 ￿ v)E of resources
is unambiguously good: these resources help win local elections and do not interfere with
nationwide elections. The portion vE, on the other hand, has the disadvantage of limiting
the party president￿ s ability to promise global public goods in the national election. If we
denote by Z the size of the federal budget, only
maxf0;Z ￿ vEg
is available for the party￿ s president to promise global public good. When the median voter￿ s
ideal point in the nation-wide election exceeds that level, the party president is constrained
in his ability to promise enough global public good. When factions are strong, E is large
and the president is more constrained.
This argument does not necessarily favor parties with weak factions: when v is small, the
incentive e⁄ect of factions dominates over the ￿ exibility-reducing e⁄ect, and factions play a
useful role on balance. Nevertheless, to the extent that electing the party president in the
nationwide election is a public good for party o¢ cers, this argument indicates that factions
exert a negative externality on each other. This is analogous to a common-pool problem,
where the common pool of resources is Z; the size of the federal budget.
7.5 Rational Voters and the Political Budget Cycle
We now turn to modeling the behavior of voters, which in the main model was captured by
the two numbers ￿ and b. Here our principal goal is provide a rational-voter model where ￿
is endogenous and positive. This does not seem a stringent requirement￿ it is natural that
the party should be more likely to be elected if it is successful at providing public projects.
The model we o⁄er is a ￿political budget cycle￿model along the lines of Rogo⁄ (1990), in
which the public projects are provided before the election. We choose this model because we
want our results to speak to the allocation of the political budget cycle across municipalities,
an allocation we study empirically in Section 8 below.
A detailed description and analysis of the model with strategic voters is deferred to Appendix
C. Here we o⁄er just a sketch.
35Sketch of the model Voters live for two periods in an overlapping generation model.
When young, voters are uncertain about the size of the party faction in their state, and so
they start out with a prior which, in steady state, is given by equation (4). If they do not
receive the public project, voters believe that their faction is not that powerful and thus
re-elect the party with probability of only b. If voters receive the public project, they update
positively on the size of their faction, and thus they become more willing to vote for it
because they realize that a strong faction is valuable in the future (it will continue to bring
in pork). In this case, they re-elect the party with probability b + ￿:
Brief discussion of the model The key element of the model is that voters are not
perfectly informed about the power of their candidate￿ s faction. This seems reasonable,
since in reality the power of a faction is impermanent and it is determined by opaque intra-
party patron-client relationships. Voters are unlikely to know much about this. Anecdotal
evidence supports the view that voters are imperfectly informed of the power of the candidate
to deliver pork spending. Curtis (1992, p. 228),32 for example, writes:
￿[T]he stress [of the electoral candidate] is on constituency service to convince voters that
the candidate has the clout in Tokyo to bring the district new roads and bridges, industrial
development, and higher living standards.￿
8 Case Study: The Political Budget Cycle in Mexico￿ s
Water Services
8.1 Outline
In this section we illustrate predictions of the factional model with a case study of water
infrastructure spending in Mexico. We do not observe Mexican factions (camarillas) di-
rectly. Instead we look for their telltale e⁄ects on the allocation of public resources and
promotion patterns in the ruling party (at the time, the PRI). Using newly coded panel data
on the number of connections to public water grids collected from several hundred Mexican
municipalities we estimate regressions to:
Document a ￿political budget cycle￿
￿ There is a substantial spike in the number of new connections to the water grid in
governor￿ s election years.
32Cited from Scheiner (2005), p. 807.
36We then study the distribution of this political cycle across municipalities and:
Find a party stronghold premium
￿ As predicted by the model, the cycle appears only in municipalities with governors
from the ruling PRI. Municipalities represented by governors from opposition parties
(and thus are assumed to have no factional power) appear to have no cycle.
￿ Moreover, the cycle appears only in PRI strongholds. The bene￿ciaries of cycle spend-
ing are municipalities that have long supported the PRI and/or elected PRI governors
by wide margins.
Find political careers predict the resource allocation
￿ Cycle expenditure is positively correlated with measures of camarilla strength. As
predicted by the model, the cycle disproportionately favors constituencies represented
by politicians who are later promoted in the PRI.
￿ Indeed, we ￿nd some evidence that, as predicted by the model, conditioning on this
measure of camarilla strength ￿explains￿the stronghold premium.
Thus the empirical analysis indicates this budget cycle systematically favors some munic-
ipalities over others ￿ and the cross-sectional distribution of the bene￿ts is distinctively
consistent with our model of factional competition.
8.2 Mexico as a Testbed for the Factional Theory
During the period of our sample, Mexico had several characteristics that make it a natural
setting for illustrating our model.
1. Mexico had a highly centralized state with a powerful party (the PRI) that exercised a
great deal of control over expenditures by lower levels of government.33 For example,
in our data on water services expenditure, more than 50% of the investment in in-
frastructure came directly from the central government, with a further 25% from state
matching funds. As there are no opposition parties dispensing funds, the allocation of
resources should be expected to have the properties described in Proposition 7.
33See Ameringer (1992, pages 408-411) for a summary of the Mexican system, and Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni
and Weingast, (2003) for quantitative evidence of the reliance by local governments on federal support.
372. Support by o¢ cials of ranks below the nominee￿ s proposed position was very important
for promotion in the PRI, and often formally required.34
3. Camarillas were widely understood to be essential to success in politics.35
8.3 Quantitative Evidence and Interpretation
Our data include a balanced panel of the number of potable water (inlet) and sewage (outlet)
connections to public networks in 463 municipalities, collected annually from 1994-2001.36
To avoid confounding the e⁄ects of camarillas with other determinants of the number of
connections in a municipality, we estimate models of annual changes in connections per
capita, and thus di⁄erence out ￿xed municipality e⁄ects; we also allow municipality-speci￿c,
linear time trends and condition on several demographic variables described below. Finally,
we focus on ￿political budget cycles,￿spikes in government expenditure in election years.37
Concentrating on this form of expenditure has the advantage of isolating the discretionary,
pork-barrel spending that is the focus of distributive politics models.
More precisely, our regressions take the following form:
￿ym;t = ￿0 + ￿1Em;t + ￿2Em;t ￿ Zm + Xm;t￿3 + ￿m + ￿t + "m;t
where ￿ym;t is the annual change in the number of water network connections per capita
in municipality m in period t; Em;t is an indicator for a state governor￿ s election; Xm;t is a
vector of time￿ varying demographic variables; ￿m is a ￿xed municipality-speci￿c e⁄ect, ￿t
is a time-speci￿c e⁄ect common to all municipalities; and "r;t is the error term. We ￿rst
document the average budget cycle by showing ￿1 > 0; when ￿2 is restricted to equal zero.
34The appointment of a minister, vice-minister, party president or general secretary, or director of a state-
owned company required formal approval from party o¢ cials at lower ranks. Similar approval from below
is required for party nominees to elected posts such as President, Senator or Federal Deputy. According to
Ameringer (1992) ￿the importance of the representation of local and state committees in the PRI￿ s decision-
making bodies was increased (with the reform of the party￿ s statues in 1990) to give them parity with the
sectoral organizations. [...] the new PRI statutes call for the party￿ s presidential candidate to be selected
by a National Political Council composed of 150 prominent party members, who will vote by secret ballot.
However, the president retains the power to nominate party leaders personally loyal to him as members
of the National Political Council, and their votes are likely to re￿ ect his preference. [...] candidates for
elective o¢ ce, except the presidency, must demonstrate the support of a speci￿c percentage of the ￿directive
committees￿of PRI-a¢ liated organizations or of the registered voters in a given district.￿
35Camp (2003, p. 117) writes, ￿[The camarilla] has determined prior to 2000, more than any other variable
discussed, who goes to the top of the political ladder, what paths are taken and the speci￿c posts they are
assigned,￿(page 117).
36Appendix D provides further information about the data and the institutional backdrop in Mexico.
37See, e.g., Rogo⁄ (1990), Persson and Tabellini (2000), and Shi and Svensson (2006). Drazen (2000)
provides a survey on political cycles.
38(1) (2)
Variables Change in inlets per capita Change in outlets per capita





Demographic controls Yes Yes
Municipality dummies Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 3,241 3,241
Adjusted R2 0.448 0.233
Table 1: Regression of the Annual Change in Water Connections per Capita on an Indicator
for Governor￿ s Election.
Note: Dependent variables are, in column (1), the annual change in inlets (potable water connections) per
capita and, in column (2), the annual change in outlets (sewage network connections) per capita. Demo-
graphic controls are listed in the Data Appendix. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level
are in parentheses. ** denotes signi￿cance at 5% level.
Then we study the distribution of the cycle across municipalities by interacting the indicator
of an election (Em;t) with various (￿xed) characteristics of the municipalities, Zm:
On average across municipalities, we ￿nd an economically and statistically signi￿cant cycle
in spending associated with state governor elections. The estimates in Column 1 of Table 1
indicate that years in which a governor￿ s election is held, the change in water inlets per capita
is, on average, 0.0072 higher. This represents an increase of 125% above the average annual
change, or approximately $US 44 million in additional expenditure in these municipalities.38
Column 2 of Table 1 presents analogous results for spending on water outlets (connections
to a public sewer network). We ￿nd no evidence of a cycle in this form of infrastructure
spending.39
To study the distribution of the political cycle, we interact the indicator of a governor￿ s
election with (￿xed) characteristics of the municipalities. In Table 2, we ￿rst allow the
relationship between the governor￿ s election and water service provision to depend on the
party a¢ liation of the incumbent governor. Consistent with Proposition 7, part e, the results
in column 2 of Table 2 indicate that the political budget cycle in this form of spending appears
only in those states where the incumbent governor is from the PRI. In PRI-governed state
the election is associated with an additional :0077 inlets per capita. In the states where the
38These results are consistent with the ￿ndings in Gonzalez (2002) of a sizeable political cycle in infrastruc-
ture spending and are robust to the inclusion of controls for municipal and congressional elections, and their
interactions. Those estimates are available from the authors upon request.
39Anecdotal evidence suggests that outlets hold less appeal for voters (septic ￿elds and outhouses are
relatively easy for private owners to construct). Moreover, engineering considerations make the provision of
an inlet less expensive and time consuming, on average.
39governor is a member of an opposition party,40 and thus according to the model the district￿ s
faction is size zero, summing the ￿rst two coe¢ cients indicates there is no additional spike
in spending in the year of the election.
Column￿ s 3 and 4 of Table 2 evaluate other dimensions of the model￿ s stronghold spending
predictions. Consistent with Proposition 7 part a, the point estimates in these columns
indicate that municipalities with higher b￿ s as measured either by uninterrupted support for
PRI candidates (column 3) or by wide margins of victory for the PRI (column 4) are most
favored by this form of political spending. While, especially in the case of the measure of
uninterrupted support, the coe¢ cients are somewhat imprecisely estimated, they imply that
indicators of high b￿ s ￿explain￿the previous ￿nding that only municipalities represented by
PRI governors bene￿t from the cycle spending. It isn￿ t merely that these governors are
members of the ruling party it￿ s that they represent PRI strongholds.
Finally, we allow the relationship between the governor￿ s election and water service provision
to depend on even more direct measures of camarilla strength. In columns 5 and 6 of Table
2, we present the results of regressions where the timing of a governor￿ s election is interacted
with an indicator for the later political success of the incumbent PRI governor. Here, later
success is identi￿ed with governors who go on to hold either higher political o¢ ce or party
leadership positions.41 Consistent with Proposition 7, part c, spending in time t predicts the
later political success of the incumbent governor at time t: The incumbent PRI governors
whose constituents most bene￿ted from cycle spending in the year they left o¢ ce are the
governors who go on to hold higher positions in the party ￿an indicator of membership in
a powerful camarilla. Pushing the model￿ s predictions further still, we ￿nd mixed evidence
that, consistent with Proposition 7, part e, conditioning on this measure of camarilla strength
eliminates the party stronghold (large b) e⁄ect. In column (5), the model￿ s prediction holds;
conditioning on the future success of the incumbent governor ￿explains￿why municipalities
with long-standing support for the PRI are favored by political spending. In column (6),
controlling for this measure of faction size weakens the positive relationship between the PRI
margin of victory and the cycle size, but does not eliminate it.
All of our estimates include controls for the level of poverty in the municipality. Thus, the
￿ndings that party strongholds and the constituents of strong camarillas bene￿t from the
cycle, do not appear to re￿ ect the relative needs of those municipalities. Similarly, in results
not presented here, we ￿nd no evidence that the municipalities favored by the political cycle
in spending are those with particularly high turnout in governors elections.
40During this period, the opposition is largely from the right-of-center Partido Acci￿n Nacional (PAN). Of
the muncipalities in our data represented by opposition party governors, 90% (507) are represented by PAN
governors, while 10% (54) are represented by a Partido de la Revoluci￿n DemocrÆtica (PRD) governor.
41The positions identi￿ed with later success include minister, vice-minister, senator, federal deputy, party
president or general secretary, and general director of a state-owned company. Each of these requires party
support, and only some positions of senator and federal deputy require voter approval.
40Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
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Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 3,241 3,241 3,241 3,241 3,241 3,241
Adjusted R2 0.448 0.448 0.448 0.448 0.448 0.449
Table 2: OLS Regression of the Annual Change in Inlets per Capita, by Electoral Factors
Note 1: The dependent variable is the annual change in inlets (potable water connections) per capita.
Note 2: Variable De￿ntions: A state has not experienced an alternation in the governorship at t if the PRI
has won all elections up to time t. A state faced a non-competitive election in t if the winner-second ratio
is larger then the median of our sample (1.28). Demographic controls are described in the Data Appendix.
Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in parentheses. *, ** denote signi￿cance at
10% and 5% level, respectively.
41Variables (1) (2) (3)
Ratio of winner-second voting





Ratio of winner-second voting





Fraction PRI Municipalities in t ￿ 1
-0.1273
(0.6703)










No. of Obs. 31 27 27
R2 0.073 0.049 0.109
Table 3: Linear Probability Model of Governor￿ s Promotion
Note: The dependent variable is an indicator for the future success (promotion) of an incumbent governor.
Fraction PRI Muncipalities measures the fraction of muncipalities in the state with PRI mayors in o¢ ce.
Standard errors, robust to heteroskedasticity, are in parentheses. *** denotes signi￿cance at the 1% level.
Another interpretation of results linking incumbent promotion and the size of the cycle is
that is that these successful governors were unusual political talents and thus better able to
marshal resources to bene￿t the party at election time. Using the limited data available to
investigate this possibility, Table 3 relates later success in the party to the vote share won
by the incumbent himself (in the previous election), and by his successor.42 We estimate,
with considerable statistical con￿dence, that there is no meaningful correlation between a
governor￿ s later success and the vote share he won in his own election. Indeed the point
estimate in Column 1 of Table 3 implies that later success is negatively correlated with own
vote share; though a relationship either two standard errors larger or smaller would remain
qualitatively insubstantial. This this ￿nding is unchanged if, as in Column 3, we condition
on measures of historical party support in the state (the fraction of municipalities with a PRI
mayor in o¢ ce); we ￿nd no evidence that later successful governors were particularly talented
vote-getters. This too is consistent with our model of factional competition, particularly with
Proposition 7, part d.
These results leave open the possibility that some unobserved variable unrelated to factions
a⁄ects the governor￿ s ability to deliver resources, and increases his likelihood of promotion,
but is unrelated to his vote-getting ability. Overall, however, we view these results on water
42These data are limited because there are only 31 incumbent governors during the period we observe
water service expenditure. Data from substantially earlier periods would not be informative because political
competition was virtually non-existent.
42infrastructure spending in Mexico as supportive of the factional model. As important, in our
view, the preceding analysis o⁄ers a template for using the factional model to make novel
and testable predictions about readily available data.
9 Conclusion
We presented a new model of factional political competition, where the allocation of re-
sources is driven by intra-party politics. Despite its simplicity, the model delivers a rich
set of implications, both static and dynamic, about the allocation of local and global public
goods. A number of these implications found a counterpart in our empirical analysis of newly
collected data on the provision of water services in Mexico.
A distinctive feature of the factional model of politics is that the actual power to procure
public goods is not vested in elected o¢ ce: instead, that power is distributed broadly across
the party. In equilibrium, those who hold power coalesce into party factions, which become
the sources of actual, as opposed to formal, power to procure public resources. In our model,
elections and the internal party organization are seen as a system of ￿incentives for (informal)
teams￿(in our case, factions).
The allocation of resources in a factional equilibrium is di⁄erent from that obtained in other
models of distributive politics. Of particular note is the factional model￿ s predicted bias
in favor of party strongholds, a bias has been reported in many empirical studies of cross-
sectional resource allocations. We do not claim that factions are the only source of stronghold
premium. Rather, the point is that factions will accentuate that bias, and generally distort
the allocation of resources above and beyond the formal rules of the party and the political
system.
We view this paper is an initial foray into a promising new ￿eld of ￿political personnel
economics.￿ The premise in this paper is that parties are not unitary actors, but rather
aggregations of politicians each using public resources to further his own career. If that is
right, then to understand resource allocation it becomes crucial to study intra-party career
incentives. Just as personnel economics has delivered important new insights by looking
at intra-￿rm incentive schemes, we expect that the rules of party organization, and the
careers of individual political personnel, will prove to be important factors in predicting the
allocation of public resources. We hope much work will be done along those lines.
43Appendices (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
A Competition among large number of factions
We model the within-party competition for resources as a tournament among a large number
of factions. N factions compete for qN prizes (units of the public good) where q < 1. We
allow a faction to be as small as a single member. Whether a faction i receives the public
good depends on both e⁄ort and luck; speci￿cally, the qN factions with the greatest in￿ uence
ri receive the public good, where





Here ui is the luck element, the realization from a uniform distribution U with support
[￿1;+1]: The e⁄ort element is represented by the discounted sum of the er: The element
er ￿ 0 represents the e⁄ort put in by state-i faction member r. S is the size of the faction
at time t:
Faction i wins the public good if and only if ri exceeds the q-th quantile of the empirical
distribution of the equilibrium r￿ s. The q-th quantile is a random variable. However, since
the realizations ui are uncorrelated across factions, as N ! 1 this quantile converges in
probability to a number which we denote by I: In the limit when the number of factions
grows, faction i wins a public good if and only if ri ￿ I: Now,
Pr(ri ￿ I) = Pr
 
















To be exact, the second equality holds only when the numerator of the fraction is within the
support of U, which must necessarily be the case in equilibrium since no faction would want
to exert more e⁄ort than it takes to win for sure. Then, in equilibrium the probability that
the public good is provided to state i is given by







where i = (3 ￿ I)=2. We see that a large faction ￿nds it easier to provide the public good
to its constituents.
44B Uniqueness of factional equilibrium
In this section we provide results about the uniqueness of factional equilibrium. In order
to characterize the set of equilibria when network members have veto power (part b. in
Proposition 4 below), we need to de￿ne formally how veto power is assigned in general
networks which may not be factions. To this end, let us append an additional action to
our game. We assume that, after party o¢ cers of rank k declare whom they support for
promotion, if a member of a state-s network worked for the same state in the previous period,
that member has the power to veto each of the other rank-k member(s) of the network (if
any). Vetoed members cannot be supported by rank-(k ￿ 1) members.
Proof of Proposition 4
a. In equilibrium, no o¢ cer will switch from faction ’ to faction ’0 is he is going to
be the highest ranking member in faction ’0: Consider a putative equilibrium where more
than one member of a given rank is supported, and consider the decision problem of a rank-1
o¢ cer at the time when all ranks above 1 have pledged their allegiances. Let us compare all
the possible networks under the assumption that exactly one rank-1 member joins each. Pick
the one that has the highest probability of survival. No member could hope to have a higher
level of utility than that a⁄orded by that network. The o¢ cer who worked for that network
in the previous period, if there is one, can guarantee himself that level of utility by declaring
for that network (due to Lemma 3 and Assumption A1). In this case only one o¢ cer will
declare for that network, and it will be the o¢ cer who worked for it in the previous period.
If there is no such o¢ cer, then that place cannot be occupied by someone who did not work
in that state in the previous period because they would not be able to select a rank-0 o¢ cer.
By induction, we can extend this argument to the second, third, etc. most desirable networks
which have an o¢ cer of rank 1, and we have shown that in any equilibrium all rank-1 o¢ cer
in equilibrium will declare for the state they chose in the previous period. By induction,
this argument extends to all ranks above 1, and it shows that at every rank every o¢ cer will
declare for the state they chose in the previous period.
b. Consider then the decision problem of a rank-1 o¢ cer at the time when all ranks
above 1 have pledged their allegiances. In equilibrium, whatever the allocation of rank-1
o¢ cers across networks, if a member could veto all others in his network, by Lemma 4 he
would do so. Let us compare all the possible networks under the best-case scenario that only
one rank-1 member joins each. Pick the one that has the highest probability of survival. No
member could hope to have a higher level of utility than that a⁄orded by that network. The
o¢ cer who worked for that network in the previous period can guarantee himself that level
of utility by declaring for that network and vetoing all other members. So only one o¢ cer
will declare for that network, and it will be the o¢ cer who worked for it in the previous
period. The rest of the proof follows part a. ￿
45C Rational Voters Model
Dominant party The dominant party controls the federal bureaucracy, so only politicians
belonging to the ruling party can choose to provide public goods to a state.
Citizens Citizens live for two periods. Before voting in each period, citizens of a state
may, or may not, receive a unit of local public good g 2 f0;1g: Because the public good
is provided before the vote, when young citizens vote they are concerned only with the
probability of receiving the public good when old. Insofar as they are in￿ uenced by the
public good received when young, it is as a signal of the probability of receiving g when old.
Young citizens also care about the appeal of the opposition candidate in period t, denoted by
at (the appeal of the incumbent party￿ s candidate in each period is normalized to zero). That
appeal is unknown until just before the vote, and is assumed to be drawn from a continuous
cdf F:
Old citizens are cynical and do not care about the candidates￿appeal. They only enjoy the
public good, if it is provided to them.
Information Faction members know the size St of their faction. However, St is not known
to voters who, at the beginning of period t; share a prior probability ￿t (s) that St = s:
We assume that young citizens (the only citizens who vote) have no information about their
faction except that they can observe whether the party has an outgoing governor. That piece
of information is the only state variable that voters can condition on. There will therefore be
two sets of beliefs for young voters. When young voters see an outgoing governor from the
opposition at t, then they know that St = 0: When young voters see an outgoing governor
from the party, their prior beliefs at the beginning of time t are described by ￿t:4344
43In our model voters have very limited knowledge of history: they only know whether the outgoing
governor is from the ruling party. This assumption reduces the state space of the voter￿ s decision problem. If
we relaxed this assumption and allowed young voters to know the result of a given number of past elections,
for example, then the decisions of all agents in the model would depend on a richer set of state variables.
This would complicate the analysis, but it would not eliminate the basic force that generates the budget
cycle. As long as voters do not perfectly know the power of their faction, politicians will signal by providing
local public goods.
44It is natural ask whether a candidate might ￿nd other ways to signal the power of his faction, such
as presidential visits to his state, public endorsements, etc. To this question we have two answers. First,
candidates may well signal in multiple ways￿ we do not claim that the signal appears in only in the provision
of public expenditure. Second, however, we point out that in order for the signaling to be sustained in
equilibrium, at least part of the signaling must be by means of material bene￿t to voters. Otherwise, if
signaling is only costly to candidates but is not materially bene￿cial to voters, there is no incentive for voters
to support the candidate, since the future reward for the support would only be more materially useless
signaling.
46C.1 Voters￿Behavior in a Stationary Equilibrium
In this section we look for a stationary (time invariant) equilibrium of the game. In such
an equilibrium, young voters enter each period with a belief ￿t = ￿ about their faction￿ s
strength. This belief is stationary and thus is not subscripted by t. We require that equilib-
rium beliefs be correct, in the sense that the probability distribution ￿t+1 must be consistent
with ￿t and the promotion probabilities induced by the equilibrium e⁄ort of party members.
In such a stationary equilibrium, a faction member at position r exerts the same level of
e⁄ort in every period (that level is not the same, of course, across faction members).
Until now, voter behavior has been summarized by B and b: We now explain how these two
statistics are determined in equilibrium, with particular attention to the question of whether
B > b, i.e., whether (and why) voters are swayed by the pre-electoral provision of public
goods.
Old voters in period t have no reason to vote, so we will have them abstain.45
Young voters are responsive to gt insofar as it portends the future realization of gt+1: A
young citizen votes as if he were pivotal. If he elects the party candidate then his future
payo⁄ is E￿t (gt+1jgt;party gov. wins at t): If he votes for the opposition he gets at.46 At
the stationary equilibrium ￿t = ￿ and so a voter chooses the party if
at ￿ E￿ (gt+1jgt;party candidate wins at t)











B represents the probability that voters vote for the party candidate after the realization
gt = 1 is known, but before at is known. Thus,




























45We could just as well have them vote in a ￿xed proportion for the party candidate. The important thing
for our purposes is that they are not responsive to gt.
46There is no public good in period t+1 because we have assumed that the opposition cannot provide the
public good, and the party has no state s faction at t+1. Even if we allowed the opposition to provide some
public good to state s, that state￿ s faction within the opposition party is of size 1 in period t + 1; and thus
much smaller than the expected value of the party￿ s faction. This would lead voters to discount heavily the
monetary return from defeating the party candidate.
47It is now intuitive that B ￿ b : the event gt = 1 is more likely when St is large, so conditioning
on that event increases the likelihood that St is large. We now show formally that B ￿ b:
Lemma 5 for any ￿; B ￿ b
Denote the posterior distribution over St upon seeing the public good as ￿ (sj1) = Pr(St = sjgt = 1):
We show that ￿ (sj1) ￿rst order stochastically dominates the prior ￿ (s): Let us start with
the following expression
￿ (sj1) = Pr(St = sjgt = 1)
=
Pr(gt = 1jSt = s)Pr(St = s)
P1





















r]￿(j) > 1: Then

























This means that the curve ￿ (sj1) lies below the curve ￿ (s) if and only if s is smaller than
some ￿ s: This means that the c.d.f. of ￿ (sj1) lies below that of ￿ (s), as we wished to show.
Now, let us show that B > b: De￿ne the function







The function ￿ (S) is increasing, and so stochastic dominance implies
E (￿ (S)j￿;gt = 1) > E (￿ (S)j￿):
Using the following identity
E (￿ (S)j￿) = Pr(gt = 1j￿) ￿ E (￿ (S)j￿;gt = 1) + Pr(gt = 0j￿) ￿ E (￿ (S)j￿;gt = 0);
the previous inequality can be strengthened to yield
E (￿ (S)j￿;gt = 1) > E (￿ (S)j￿) > E (￿ (S)j￿;gt = 0):
Then
B = F (i + E (￿ (S)j￿;gt = 1)) > F (i + E (￿ (S)j￿;gt = 0)) = b:
48C.2 Existence of equilibrium
At any equilibrium of the rational voters game equations (3), (C2) and (C3) must hold.




























We are interested in equilibria in which positive e⁄ort is exerted and the public good is
provided with positive probability. In these equilibria the right hand side has to be nonzero,
which requires that ￿(s) be non-degenerate, i.e., it cannot put mass 1 on a particular s
(otherwise conditioning on gt has no e⁄ect). In order to construct such equilibria, for each
r we need to ￿nd pairs (e￿
r;￿) that solve the equation and such that fe￿
rg generates ￿:
Let us start by showing that for any given vector ferg, there exists at least one pair of
numbers ￿ B;￿ b such that the ￿ generated by ferg; ￿ B;￿ b solves (C2) and (C3).
Start with arbitrarily chosen B0;b0: Let G : [0;1]
2 ! ￿1 denote the generating process, and
denote ￿0 = G(B0;b0) the probability distribution generated by B0;b0. Now plug ￿0 into
expressions (C2) and (C3); to obtain the pair B1;b1: We can formalize this process as feeding
￿0 into a function H : ￿1 ! [0;1]
2 : We are interested in the properties of the composition
H ￿ G which takes as its argument a pair Bt;bt and maps it into a pair Bt+1;bt+1: Both G
and H are continuous, so the composition is continuous. The composition also maps the
square [0;1]
2 into itself. By Brouwer￿ s theorem, then, the composition H ￿ G must have a
￿xed point ￿ B;￿ b. Then we know that ￿ ￿ = G
￿ ￿ B;￿ b
￿
solves (C2) and (C3).47
Let us call ￿ B (e1);￿ b(e1) the set of ￿xed points associated with ferg. Note that if the vector
ferg is an equilibrium then it is appropriate to use the ￿rst element of the vector only, since
the entire vector ferg is completely determined through equation(C4) once its ￿rst element
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The RHS might be a correspondence ￿we have not proved that ￿ B (e1);￿ b(e1) is a singleton.
Nevertheless, for each e1 > 0 the lower bound of the RHS is positive (see 5). Thus, for c(￿)
su¢ ciently convex we are ensured that an equilibrium with positive e⁄ort exists.
47Thanks to Ennio Stacchetti for pointing out the ￿xed point argument.
49D Empirical Appendix
This appendix provides further background on water services provision in Mexico and some
details of our empirical analysis.
D.1 Institutional Backdrop
Water services and infrastructure are central issues in Mexican politics. Large fractions
of the population have no connection to a potable water network and water services and
infrastructure development are the subjects of considerable public policy. Since 1983, the
provision and development of water services have been the responsibility of municipal govern-
ments. Some (30%) state governments have, however, assumed this authority. Under either
state or municipal authority, the actual development and provision of services is performed
by government-sanctioned water companies. These companies are governed by executive
boards composed of members of state/municipal government, public o¢ cials appointed by
the relevant mayor/governor, members of state Congresses, and in some cases representatives
of private investors.
Investment spending by these companies is substantial and supported largely by Federal and
State funds. Data from the National Water Commission (CNA)48 indicate that, on average,
76% of water services investment was funded by Federal and State sources between 1991 and
2001. The remainder of the investment was funded either by loans to the water companies
or by municipal governments. The level of total investment ranges from approximately $175
to $391 million in 2001 dollars.
D.2 Data
We use three data sets in our quantitative analysis. The ￿rst is newly coded data from
CNA reports. It contains annual (calendar year) information on the number of drinking
water (inlets) and sewage connections (outlets), e⁄ective price per cubic meter of water,
total water supply, and total revenues of 717 (out of 2,443) Mexican municipalities from
1995 to 2001. This is an unbalanced panel. The second data set on electoral results was
obtained from the Data Set of Mexican Municipal Electoral Outcomes 1980-1999 created
by Alain de RØmes. It contains parties￿voting shares and voting turnout for municipal
elections held within that period. These data were supplemented with relevant municipal
election data for 2000 and 2001, and gubernatorial electoral outcomes from 1994 to 2001
obtained from state electoral institutes. The third data set contains demographic data from
48National Water Commission, Report on the Situation of Potable Water, Santitation and Sewarage 2001.
50the Municipal Data Base System created by the Mexican Census Bureau. We combined these
data with cross-sectional municipal data obtained from the National Census for 1990, 1995
and 2000. Data for missing years was ￿lled in using a linear interpolation. After merging
these datasets we obtained a balanced panel dataset of 463 municipalities from 1994 to 2001.
These municipalities represent each of Mexico￿ s 32 states except Chihuahua and Mexico
City, for which data are unavailable. The data capture approximately 40% of Mexico￿ s total
population; however they represent just 19% of the 2,443 municipalities in Mexico.
D.2.1 Summary Statistics
In the balanced panel, the average annual increase of inlets per capita during electoral years
is 0.0058. This represents an average increase of approximately 520 inlets per community,
where the mean population size in our data set is 88,900 inhabitants. Using data from the
CNA from 1991 to 2001, we estimate the average cost of a water service inlet to be $764 in
2002 pesos or US$73. Assuming the Federal government funds half of this cost, we estimate
an average annual total expenditure of $359 million pesos (US $34 million) on water inlets
in these municipalities.
We focus on the change in water services provision during governor￿ s election years. With
very few exceptions, governor￿ s elections are held every 6 years typically in the second half
of the year. Governor￿ s elections are fairly evenly distributed across municipalities and years
in our data.49 Table E.1 presents summary statistics of the panel data. The demographic
controls included in our regressions are: population density and its square, the population
growth rate, and the fraction of workers earning less than the minimum wage. Table E.1
also presents a simple comparison of the average change in inlets per capita in and out of
governor￿ s election years. There is a sizeable, but statistically insigni￿cant di⁄erence (the
p-value of one-sided test is 0.074); the average annual change in inlets per capita is nearly
twice as large when the municipality has a governor￿ s election than in other years.
D.3 Robustness of Estimates
Our results regarding the budget cycle in water services are robust to several alternative
speci￿cations. For example, our estimates are qualitatively similar if we drop demographic
variables and year e⁄ects. The same applies if we include controls for mayoral, and congres-
sional elections and their interactions. It is, however, important to include a municipality-
speci￿c linear trend. We would expect communities to experience di⁄erent rates of growth
49We observe a governor￿ s election in 611 municipalities (with some repeats). This amounts to an average
of 76 muncipalities voting in a governor￿ s election, per year in our data with a high of 162 in 1998 and a low
of 0 in 1996.
51Variables Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Inlets per capita 3704 0.221 0.130 0.954 0.003 21.038
Outlets per capita 3704 0.138 0.071 0.660 0.001 15.056
Annual change in inlets per capita 3241 0.0069 0.0018 0.0900 -1.5667 1.9051
Annual change in outlets per capita 3241 0.0041 0.0002 0.0804 -1.4383 2.3249
Fraction of workers earning
less than minimum wage
3704 0.32 0.28 0.19 0.04 0.90
Density of population 3704 442.6 67.1 1563.9 0.8 17772.3
Winner-second ratio, gov.￿ s election 539 1.39 1.28 0.31 1.02 2.06
Party of incumbent gov.
PAN=1, PRI=2, PRD=3, Other=4
3704 1.89 2.00 0.39 1.00 4.00
Years w/o Gov.￿ s Elections Years w/ Gov.￿ s Elections
Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev.
Annual change in inlets per capita 0.0058 0.0016 0.0904 0.0119 0.0024 0.0883
Annual change in outlets per capita 0.0038 0.0002 0.0846 0.0058 0.0004 0.0561
Table D1: Summary Statistics of the Panel Data, 1994-2001
of water infrastructure according to unobserved geographical factors such as altitude, ac-
cessibility to natural water sources or closeness to larger cities. If we do not condition on
community-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects the coe¢ cients on measures of wealth along with most of
our year dummies increase their signi￿cance while the electoral cycle variables lose it.
The errors are assumed to be independent across municipalities but not within them. One
may be concerned about spatial correlation generated, for example, by state or region-speci￿c
shocks or by the e⁄ects of inter-municipality competition. To the extent that this spatial
correlation re￿ ects longer term trends, we will capture it with municipality speci￿c ￿xed
e⁄ects which we allow to be arbitrarily correlated. The estimates of the governor￿ s election
budget cycle from a model with state rather than municipality ￿xed e⁄ects is nearly identical.
One may also be concerned about serial correlation in the error terms. In the presence
of such correlation, our point estimates and the robust (clustered) standard errors would
remain consistent. Our estimates would, however, be ine¢ cient. We explored two speci￿c
forms of serial correlation: a ￿xed-e⁄ect ￿rst-order autoregressive model and Arellano-Bond
method-of-moments estimation that allows past realizations of the dependent variable to
a⁄ect its current level in a ￿xed e⁄ect environment. The later estimator uses lagged levels
of the dependent variable and the predetermined variables and di⁄erences of the strictly
exogenous variables assuming that there is no second-order autocorrelation of the errors.
The point estimate of the relationship between changes in inlets per capita and governor￿ s
elections is maintained although its signi￿cance is lower under both approaches.
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